Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings by Jiang, Zhaodong
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1990
Federal Arbitration Law and State Court
Proceedings
Zhaodong Jiang
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 473 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol23/iss2/2




I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 474
II. THE ENACTMENT OF STATE ARBITRATION STATUTES
AND THE USAA ......................................... 478
III. SECTION 2 OF THE USAA: SUBSTANTIVE
FEDERAL LAW .......................................... 481
A. Reach of Section 2 .................................... 482
B. Parties' Choice of State Law ........................... 488
C. Application of State Law Under Section 2 .............. 492
IV. SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE USAA ........................ 502
A. Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements ........ 503
B. Division of Functions Between Courts and Arbitrators... 505
C. Interpretation of the Scope of Arbitration Agreements... 507
D. "Procedural" Rules in General ........................ 509
E. Choice-of-Law Clauses and Rules Governing Pre-Award
Judicial Proceedings .................................. 512
V. OTHER ISSUES IN PRE-AWARD PROCEEDINGS ............ 518
A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Consolidation ........ 518
B. Appellate Review Rules ............................... 521
VI. SECTIONS 9, 10, 11 AND 12 ............................... 523
A. Section 9 ............................................. 525
B. Sections 10 and 11 .................................... 527
C. Section 12 ............................................ 528
VII. CONCLUSION .............................................. 530
* S.J.D. candidate, University of Michigan; L.L.M., University of Michigan; Graduate
Studies, Beijing University Law Department, China; B.A., Nanjing University, China; Di-
ploma of University Studies, University of Rennes, France. The author is deeply grateful to
Professor Whitmore Gray for guidance and advice. The author would also like to thank Pro-
fessor William P. Alford, M. David Minnick, Esq. and the law firm of Lillick & McHose, Los
Angeles, California, for their valuable assistance. This Article is part of a thesis to be submit-
ted to the University of Michigan Law School in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the
S.J.D. degree.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:473
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a method of dispute settlement. In arbitration, parties
voluntarily agree to refer their existing or future disputes to a third
party-an arbitrator-for determination and they agree in advance to
accept the arbitrator's decision as final and binding.1 The parties look to
arbitration as a quicker, less costly alternative to litigation. Parties are
free to select the arbitrators, the time and place of proceedings; and the
parties may also choose the substantive rules and norms to govern the
dispute-including issues of remedy. Moreover, arbitration may avoid
some of the problems which may plague parties in litigation, such as hos-
tility, disruption of any ongoing or future business relationship, or nega-
tive publicity.2
Under the common law, parties could revoke an arbitration agree-
ment at any time prior to an award.3 To change this rule, legislatures
began to enact statutes that made arbitration agreements binding on the
parties. In 1920, New York enacted the first arbitration statute in the
country that reversed the common-law rule of revocability of arbitration
agreements.' In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration
Act.' The USAA provides that arbitration agreements in maritime
transactions and in contracts affecting either interstate or foreign com-
1. This Article focuses on consensual arbitration, i.e., arbitration based on a contractual
agreement. It will not discuss arbitration compelled by court order or statute.
2. These advantages were recognized by Congress when it passed legislation regarding
voluntary patent arbitration, 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988). A committee of the United States House
of Representatives commented that
[arbitration] is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler proce-
dural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of
ongoing and future business dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in
regard to scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices; and, arbi-
trators are frequently better versed than judges and juries in the area of trade cus-
toms and the technologies involved in these disputes.
H.R. REP. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 756, 777.
3. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
4. N.Y. Arbitration Act, ch. 275, 2 N.Y. Laws 803 (1920) (codified as amended at N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501 (McKinney 1980)). For a review of the statute, see Berkovitz v.
Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
5. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208
(1988)). The United States Arbitration Act was first enacted February 12, 1925. Id. It was
codified in Title 9 of the United States Code in 1947. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat.
669. After amendment in 1954, Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 19, 68 Stat. 1233, Congress
added chapter 2 of the USAA in 1970. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692.
Section 15 (inapplicability of Act of State doctrine) was added in November of 1988. Act of
Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-669, § 1, 102 Stat. 3969. A second section 15 (appeals) was
added later that same month. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1019(a),
102 Stat. 4670.
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merce are as valid, enforceable and irrevocable as any other contract.6
Today, the overwhelming majority of states have enacted arbitration
statutes which follow the pattern of the New York and federal arbitra-
tion statutes and adopt a policy in favor of the use of arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution.7
Difficult issues arise from the relationship between the USAA and
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
7. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) is one of the most important modem arbitration
statutes adopted by states. The current UAA was approved in 1955 by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association. UNIF.
ARBrrRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
Fifty jurisdictions have adopted some type of modem arbitration statute with 32 states
adopting the UAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (1983)
(adopting UAA); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982) (adopting UAA); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224 (1987) (adopting UAA); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-
1298.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -223 (1987) (adopting
UAA); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 5701-5725 (1975) (adopting UAA); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to -4314 (1989) (adopting
UAA); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -83
(Supp. 1989); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -12 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1979)
(adopting UAA); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101-123 (1987) (adopting UAA); IND. CODE
§§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (1986) (adopting UAA); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-.14 (West 1987)
(adopting UAA); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1982) (adopting UAA); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-4217 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (1980)
(adopting UAA); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984) (adopting
UAA); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West 1988) (adopting UAA); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 600.5001-.5305 (Callaghan 1988) (adopting UAA); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30
(West 1988) (adopting UAA); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-101 to -143 (Supp. 1988) (adopting
statutory rules for arbitrating future disputes which only apply to construction contracts with
some exceptions); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1989) (adopting UAA); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601
to -2622 (Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.015-.205 (Michie 1987)
(adopting UAA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-10 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1
(West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978) (adopting UAA); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1-.20 (1983) (adopting UAA);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 (Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (West Supp.
1989) (adopting UAA); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.300 (1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7301-7320 (Purdon 1982) (adopting UAA); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); S.D. CODIFMED
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1987) (adopting UAA); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -
320 (Supp. 1988) (adopting UAA); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (Vernon
Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-I to -18 (1987) (adopting UAA);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
581.01-.016 (Supp. 1989) (adopting UAA); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1961);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-.18 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988) (adopt-
ing UAA). Puerto Rico has also adopted a similar arbitration statute. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
32, §§ 3201-3229 (1968). A few states, such as Alabama and West Virginia, have not adopted
any such arbitration statutes.
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state arbitration statutes. This Article focuses on one of those federal-
state relationship issues-application of the federal arbitration law in
state court proceedings.' Under common law, the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements or awards was treated as procedural or remedial, and
arbitration cases were decided under the law of the forum.9 However,
the enactment of the USAA has raised the issue of whether the federal
arbitration law should be applied to state court proceedings. Most im-
portantly, the outcome of a dispute may turn on whether federal or state
arbitration law applies because differences between federal and state laws
still exist. " The United States Supreme Court has addressed the applica-
bility of a number of provisions in the federal arbitration statute to state
court proceedings.11 Recently, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
8. For discussions on application of state law in federal cases, see, e.g., Sturges & Mur-
phy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580 (1952); Note, FederalArbitration Act and Application of the
"Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DuRE L.J. 588; Note, Incorporation of State
Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1391 (1980); Note, Scope of the
United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw.
U.L. REv. 468 (1963); Note, CommercialArbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV. 607
(1967); Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of
Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960). For discussions of the
issue of application of federal arbitration law to state court proceedings, see, e.g., Atwood,
Issues in Federal-State Relations under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61
(1985); Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: the Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985); Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts: Converse Erie
Problems, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 623 (1970); Note, Preemption of State Law under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 129 (1985). This Article will not discuss the. issues
particular to application of Chapter Two of the USAA-arbitration rules governing interna-
tional commercial arbitration-to state court proceedings.
9. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (New York state
court could apply state arbitration law in maritime case because arbitration regarded as
procedural).
10. There are significant differences between federal arbitration law and various state arbi-
tration laws. Some states require that arbitration agreements include notice of existence of the
agreements. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.460 (Vernon Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). In a number of states, arbitration agreements regarding
particular contracts or claims are excluded. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-2(c)(6), (7)
(Supp. 1989) (consumer contracts); IOWA CODE § 679A.l(2)(b) (1987) (employment con-
tracts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(2) (Supp. 1988) (employment contracts); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.5005 (1987) (title to estates); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(a) (1989) (per-
sonal injury or tort); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 818 (West 1989). State arbitration statutes
may give courts the power to decide particular issues, such as whether the claim is barred by a
statute of limitations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5702(c) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-5
(Supp. 1989); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7502(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989). State arbitration
statutes may give courts the discretion to delay arbitration when the issues are related to a
pending court action. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
11. Compare Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)
(Brennan, J.) ("[S]tate courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation
under § 3 of the Arbitration Act.") with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10
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Board of Trustees,12 the Supreme Court permitted a California court to
apply a California rule pursuant to a choice-of-law clause, even though
the case fell within the federal arbitration statute.13 The California rule
gave the court discretion to stay arbitration where third parties and non-
arbitrable issues were involved in the dispute. 14 The case raised a critical
issue of federal-state relations: To what extent should parties be allowed
to choose a state law that overrides federal law, and how should parties'
intent be construed? 15
This Article first discusses the circumstances underlying the enact-
ment of arbitration statutes. It then examines the central provision in the
USAA, section 2, and its applicability to state court proceedings. Section
2 creates a body of federal substantive law governing the validity, en-
forceability, and irrevocability of arbitration agreements where the un-
derlying transaction is maritime or where the underlying contract
evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce. 6 Federal and
state courts generally agree that section 2 applies to state court proceed-
ings. 7 The second part of this Article focuses on the proper reach of
section 2 and examines the role of choice-of-law clauses in the determina-
tion of validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements and the role
of state law under section 2.
The third part of the Article deals with the application of sections 3
and 4 of the USAA to state court proceedings. These two sections con-
stitute a regulatory scheme to enforce federally created arbitration rights.
The provisions of sections 3 and 4 differ and their applicability to state
proceedings varies." For reasons outlined below, the specific enforce-
ment provisions contained in sections 3 and 4 should apply to state court
proceedings.19 The Article argues that provisions of the federal statute
touching the division of functions between courts and arbitrators, inter-
pretation of arbitration agreements, and coexistence of arbitrable and
non-arbitrable issues, should apply to state court proceedings unless the
parties have clearly agreed otherwise.
The fourth part of the Article discusses the application of federal
(1984) (Burger, C.J.) ("In holding that the Arbitration Act preempts a state law that with-
draws the power to enforce arbitration agreements, we do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the
Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts.").
12. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
13. Id. at 1253-56.
14. Id. at 1253.
15. Id. at 1251.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
18. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). See also infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 164-80 and accompanying text.
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rules and procedures to pre-award proceedings in state courts. Specifi-
cally, it focuses on preliminary injunctive relief, consolidation and appel-
late review.
The last part of the Article addresses the application of USAA post-
award rules and procedures to state court proceedings. The Article sug-
gests that whether and how federal arbitration law should apply depends
on the analysis of two issues: (1) whether the federal policy in favor of
arbitration and enforcement of arbitration rights is thwarted; and (2)
what the parties agreed to, especially with regard to choice of law.
II. THE ENACTMENT OF STATE ARBITRATION STATUTES
AND THE USAA
Historically, the common law did not favor arbitration agreements
which were revocable at any time prior to an award.2 ° Commentators
criticized the common law's hostility toward enforcement of arbitration
agreements, 21 but due to the weight of precedent and the absence of stat-
20. The common-law rule of revocability of arbitration agreements originated from Eng-
lish common law. See, eg., Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the
United States, 12 MINN. L. REv. 240 (1927-28); Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitration
Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928); Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1934). The rule maintained that to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment was to oust the courts of jurisdiction. As a court's jurisdiction is created by law, it was
considered against public policy for private parties to change the statutory judicial power
through contract. See, e.g., United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). One reason behind the "ousting of jurisdiction" theory
was the fact that judicial salaries at that time depended on litigation fees. Sayre, supra, at 611.
Furthermore, courts did not trust arbitration. Courts feared that arbitration would not protect
the legal or equitable rights of the parties in the same way as courts because arbitrators did not
possess the same authority as judges and were not bound by the same rules of law. See Tobey
v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). Also, use of
arbitration meant loss of the right to litigate, and courts were worried that a stronger party
might take advantage of a weaker party by forcing the latter to agree to arbitration instead of
litigation. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Joint Committee of the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1924)
(remarks of Julius Cohen). Finally, courts sometimes felt unable to enforce an arbitration
agreement due to a lack of adequate authority. See Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320-21. For in-
stance, where the arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrator would be mutually se-
lected by the parties and one party refused to participate in the selection, the court hesitated to
compel a party to make a potentially impracticable or inequitable selection. Id.
21. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
1942) (stating that while adhering to common law, earlier courts, nevertheless, criticized judi-
cial hostility toward enforcement of arbitration agreements). See also generally J. COHEN,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918). Interestingly, the common law was not
hostile to enforcement of arbitration awards. For example, in Burchell v. Marsh the Court
stated that there exists a "presumption ... in favor of the validity of the award." 58 US. 344,
351 (1854). There were several reasons for the difference in judicial attitudes toward enforce-
ment of awards. First, early English cases generally favored enforcement of awards. See, e.g.,
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utes to the contrary, courts were unwilling to change the common-law
rule allowing revocability of arbitration agreements.22
Therefore, various legislatures were left to adopt rules favoring bind-
ing arbitration. With the enactment of New York's arbitration statute in
1920,23 and the USAA in 1925,24 the common-law rule of revocability
began to lose favor.
The New York arbitration statute,25 the USAA and the arbitration
statutes in the overwhelming majority of states contain the following gen-
eral features:
(1) The validity, enforceability and revocability of an agreement to
arbitrate existing or future disputes are to be determined by the rules
governing the validity, enforceability and revocability of any other
contract.2 6
(2) The statutes set down rules and procedures for judicial actions
in pre-award proceedings .2  They were intended to make procedures for
enforcement of arbitration agreements summary and simple. 28 For ex-
ample, except for a few instances where the existence and validity of arbi-
Price v. Williams, 30 Eng. Rep. 388 (1791) (parties, by choosing private judges, placed dispute
beyond reach of any principle of law; error of mistake of law not reason for disturbing award).
Second, many of the concerns that militated against enforcement of arbitration agreements in
pre-award proceedings no longer existed in post-award proceedings. For example, one reason
for courts' refusal to compel arbitration was the difficulty in forcing a resisting party to select
an arbitrator. No such difficulty exists if both parties selected an arbitrator and the dissatisfied
party challenged the award afterward. Moreover, the issue of whether arbitration provided an
adequate solution to the dispute could be addressed through judicial review. Finally, while a
party could revoke the arbitration agreement before an award was made, the party's failure to
revoke was considered a waiver of the right to revocation. Burchell, 58 U.S. at 349. The
United States Supreme Court echoed the sentiments of the common-law courts on the issue
when the Court said: "Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters
submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, [arbitration]
should receive every encouragement from courts of equity." Id.
However, courts were limited regarding enforcement procedures. For instance, a judg-
ment of court could not be entered directly on an award. See W. STURGES, A TREATISE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 674 (1930).
22. See United States Asphalt Ref Co., 222 F. at 1010-11 (courts would not enforce arbi-
tration agreements unless compelled to such action by statute).
23. N.Y. Arbitration Act, ch. 275, 2 N.Y. Laws 803 (1920) (codified as amended at N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501 (McKinney 1980)). For a review of the statute, see Berkovitz v.
Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
24. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208
(1988)).
25. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980).
26. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501 (McKinney 1980) (origi-
nally enacted as C.P.A. 1920 § 1448). When amended in 1963 this exact language was omitted
as "unnecessary." 1963 N.Y. Laws ch. 532, § 7.
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1290 (West 1982).
28. Id.
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tration agreements are concerned, enforcement or denial of enforcement
of arbitration agreements is decided upon motion papers, affidavits and
other exhibits in a summary fashion.29 The statutes also provide the
courts with the power to decide matters which are necessary to arbitra-
tion proceedings. 30  For example, they contain rules governing the ap-
pointment of arbitrators by courts if parties are unable to reach an
agreement.3 1
(3) The statutes give arbitrators power regarding such matters as
calling witnesses and the structure of depositions,3 2 but they also author-
ize courts to provide assistance in arbitration proceedings in some
circumstances.33
(4) The statutes simplify procedures and practice in post-award
proceedings. A party which is successful at arbitration is no longer re-
quired to bring an action upon the award, unlike under common-law
arbitration rules;34 the party may simply file a motion for judgment on
the award.35
(5) Under the statutes, an award is deemed to be valid and en-
forceable unless the opposing party shows that it should be vacated or
otherwise disturbed.36 The grounds for vacation, modification or correc-
tion of awards under modern arbitration statutes are limited.37
Distinctions between the USAA and the various state arbitration
statutes can be outcome determinative. Thus, understanding how and
when the USAA will apply to state court proceedings is important to
resolution of the arbitrated dispute.
29. See Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 271-72
(1926).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7503(a), 7504 (McKinney 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:24-5 (West 1987).
31. One reason for Justice Story's refusal in Tobey v. County of Bristol specifically to en-
force arbitration agreements was that the court had no power to force the parties to select
arbitrators or to select arbitrators for the parties. 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-22 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 14,065). Many modem arbitration statutes provide courts with such power. See,
eg., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7504 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
32. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 29, at 272.
33. Under section 7 of the USAA, for instance, if a person summoned by an arbitrator to
testify in an arbitration proceeding refuses or neglects to comply with the summons, a federal
court may, upon petition, compel the attendance of the person before the arbitrator or punish
the person for contempt. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
34. See generally United States Asphalt Ref Co., 222 F. at 1010-11.
35. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 29, at 272.
36. Id. at 272-73. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:24-8 (West 1987); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7511 (McKinney 1980).
37. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1988); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2, 1286.6 (West
1982).
[Vol. 23:473
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III. SECTION 2 OF THE USAA: SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL LAW
Federal arbitration law interacts with state court proceedings in
three ways. First, the federal substantive law governing validity, enforce-
ability and irrevocability of arbitration agreements binds state courts.
38
Second, rules and procedures intended to -be part of an enforcement
scheme under federal law and which affect enforcement of federal arbi-
tration rights also bind state courts, 39 but may be displaceable by a clear
choice-of-law agreement.' Finally, certain federal rules and procedures
may not apply to state court proceedings because they are not necessary
to enforce arbitration rights.4
Section 2 of the USAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.42
38. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
39. See generally Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 579, 255 N.E.2d 774, 776-77, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663-64, cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970). These federal rules and procedures may also give way to state
rules and procedures if the latter are more favorable to enforcement of arbitration rights than
the former. See Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Mich. App. 727, 732, 335 N.W.2d 139, 141,
appeal denied, vacated in part, 419 Mich. 932, 355 N.W.2d 111 (1983).
40. See, e.g., Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1253
(1989).
41. See generally Kress Corp. v. Edward C. Levy Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 264, 269, 430
N.E.2d 593, 596-97 (1981).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 1 provides:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of
water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject
of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as
herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or
in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any
such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
terstate commerce.
Id. § 1 (1988).
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An initial question is whether section 2 creates a body of federal
substantive law governing the validity, enforceability and revocation of
arbitration agreements in transactions involving interstate commerce and
admiralty. If so, the Supremacy Clause mandates that section 2 applies
in state court proceedings as well.43 Congress' authority to enact the
USAA was based on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce.' The legislative history of the
USAA suggests that under a broad definition of Congress' power to regu-
late commerce, the USAA would make all arbitration agreements in
transactions involving commerce or admiralty valid, enforceable and ir-
revocable as a matter of federal law, and thus applicable to the states.4"
Despite questions that occasionally have been raised as to the applicabil-
ity of section 2 of the USAA to state court proceedings,46 the prevailing
view is that Congress' commerce power supports creation by section 2 of
a body of federal substantive law governing the validity and enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements in transactions involving interstate com-
merce or admiralty.4 7 Therefore, section 2 is binding on state courts.
A. Reach of Section 2
Section 2 applies to state court proceedings only where the arbitra-
tion agreement in question is "in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce."48 The question of appli-
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. See also Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commer-
cialArbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 428, 459-60 (1931); 13B
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569, at 173
(1984).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). The legis-
lative history of the USAA indicates that the arbitration legislation was founded "upon the
Federal control over interstate commerce and.., admiralty." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1924). See also Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11 ("The Federal Arbitration Act
rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.").
45. At the time the USAA was prepared, it was argued that the commerce power of Con-
gress was broad enough to support the legislation. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and HR. 646 Before the Joint Committee of the Subcomm.
on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1924). See also Atwood, supra note 8, at 77-78.
46. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); South-
land Corp., 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Alabama Oxygen Co. v.
York Int'l, 433 So. 2d 1158, 1162-67 (Ala. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984), on remand,
452 So. 2d 860, 861 (1984) (Embry, J., dissenting).
47. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)) ("The statement ... that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the
Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in
state as well as federal courts."); Moses H, Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32 ("The Arbi-
tration Act... creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement. .. ").
48. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section I of the USAA provides that "nothing herein contained
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cation of section 2 in most state arbitration cases turns on the issue of
whether the underlying contract evidenced a transaction involving inter-
state or foreign commerce. 49
1. The "transaction" concept
The USAA does not define the term "transaction." Case law deter-
mining which contractual relationships or matters constitute transactions
within the meaning of section 2 is scarce. The legislative history of the
USAA suggests that the legislation is aimed primarily at enforcement of
arbitration agreements made between merchants.5 0
An argument may be made that not all contractual relationships
and matters are transactions within the meaning of section 2. For exam-
ple, some contractual relationships and matters may not fall under sec-
tion 2 because they are normally regulated by state law and policy-
where federal interests are weak and where no policy reasons compel
application of federal arbitration law. Examples of such relationships
and matters include child support, alimony, medical malpractice, certain
insurance matters, and consumer transactions. Those relationships or
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of
workers." Id. § 1. The scope of this exclusion clause has been a controversial subject. Some
federal courts interpreted the clause as being limited to " 'workers engaged in the movement of
interstate or foreign commerce.'" Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local No. 150, 351 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1965) (quoting Tenney Eng., Inc. v. United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953)). Other
federal cases preferred a much broader scope of section 1. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (section
applied to workers engaged in production of goods shipped in interstate or foreign commerce
as well as workers transporting such goods). The prevailing view is that collective bargaining
agreements are "contracts of employment" within the meaning of the exclusion clause. See
American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 471-
73 (11th Cir. 1987). However, the modem view is that managerial or other white-collar em-
ployment contracts are not excluded under section 1. See Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783,
785 (1st Cir. 1971) (employment of registered representative in brokerage firm not excluded).
State cases have followed this federal trend. See, e.g., Donmoor, Inc. v. Sturtevant, 449 So. 2d
869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (salespersons not excluded).
49. Arbitration cases in state courts occasionally involve admiralty. See, e.g., Vigo S.S.
Corp. v. Marship Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 157, 257 N.E.2d 624, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165, cert. denied sub
nom. Frederick Snare Corp. v. Vigo S.S. Corp., 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
50. See Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9-11 (1923) (proposed federal arbitration legislation was
intended to apply in transactions between merchants). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., where it was pointed out that the USAA was intended to have a limited
application to contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods and that the
principal support for the legislation came from trade associations dealing in groceries and
other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major trading centers.
388 U.S. 395, 409 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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matters may involve commerce under a broad definition. For instance,
child support and alimony payments may be interstate, or medical serv-
ices may involve interstate travel or payments. However, these matters
are normally subject to state regulation. Thus, no overriding federal pol-
icy exists to regulate arbitration issues in those contractual relationships
and matters, even though commerce is involved. 5' Whether a particular
contractual relationship or matter is a transaction under section 2 should
be determined on the basis of federal interest and the development of
federal law and policy.
52
2. Whether commerce is involved
Once a court determines that an underlying contract evidences a
transaction within the meaning of section 2, the next issue is whether the
transaction involves either interstate or foreign commerce within the
meaning of section L In practice, the following questions significantly
51. One area where federal law might yield to state regulations is insurance. Under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982), Congress gave the states primary
responsibility for regulating the business of insurance, and exempted the business from the
application of federal law in certain circumstances. Id. § 1012(a), (b). Under that statute, a
contract or transaction is exempted from a federal law, if: (1) the federal law in question was
not intended to relate to the business of insurance; (2) the contract transaction is the "business
of insurance"; and (3) the application of the federal law would invalidate, impair or supersede
state law governing the contract or transaction. Id. It has been argued that since the USAA
was not specifically intended to regulate the business of insurance, and arbitration of insurance
claims is the "business of insurance," the USAA did not preempt the state law which explicitly
made arbitration agreements in insurance contracts invalid or unenforceable. Lamson, The
Impact of the Federal Arbitration Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act on Uninsured Motorist
Arbitration (Special Section: Insurance Law), 19 CONN. L. REV. 241, 245 (1987).
52. An area which is traditionally occupied by state legislatures may become subject to
federal regulations if federal interest in the area becomes significant. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (consumer
protection and warranty law is field traditionally occupied by states but Congress entered in
1975 with passage of Magnuson-Moss Act; therefore, state dispute-resolution mechanisms for
consumer disputes are preempted by federal law in field).
53. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1955). A linguistic
question arises here: Is there any difference between "involving commerce," as the term is
applied to section 2, and "affecting commerce," as used in other federal statutes? For the
federal statutes using "affecting," see the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, § 1, 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1982); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1982).
Most courts have seemed to ignore this difference. See, e.g., Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201 (com-
merce would be involved if employee were working in commerce, producing goods for com-
merce, or engaging in activity that affected commerce). Only a few cases suggested, however,
that "involving commerce" was intended to have a narrower scope than "affecting commerce."
Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn. 1982) (USAA used
narrower language of "involving" as opposed to "affecting"); see also Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (Congress failed
to use "affecting," statutory language Congress normally uses when it wishes to exercise its full
powers over commerce).
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affect the judicial determination of involvement of commerce:
First, could certain types of transactions be presumed to involve
commerce within the meaning of section 2 or should the party seeking
application of section 2 have the burden of proving the involvement of
commerce no matter what transaction is involved?54 For instance, is any
construction contract presumed to evidence a transaction involving com-
merce or should the court require specific proof each time a construction
contract is involved? Since construction projects normally involve inter-
state travel, purchases of materials, or other activities across state bor-
ders, 55 any construction contract may be presumed to involve commerce,
and the burden to prove the contrary rests on the party resisting applica-
tion of the USAA. On the other hand, since a construction contract it-
self may not indicate interstate activities, an argument exists that the
party seeking application of the USAA should show involvement of in-
terstate commerce.
5 6
The second question is how involvement of commerce should be
proved. Two tests have been developed. The first test looks to the par-
ties' intent to determine whether they intended their transaction to in-
volve interstate commerce. 7 The second test asks whether the
54. The answer to the question appears to be simple in some cases. See, e.g., Krauss Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933) (contract clearly
involved commerce if it required one to ship goods from Newark to Manhattan).
55. See Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522, 523-24
(Minn. 1979). See also Trident Tech. College v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 104, 333
S.E.2d 781, 785 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986) (contract to design and supervise
construction of campus); University Casework Sys., Inc. v. Bahre, 172 Ind. App. 624, 362
N.E.2d 155 (1977) (contract to construct university facility in Indiana). See Note, Preemption
of State Law under the FederalArbitration Act, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 129, 151 (1985) ("[lit is
difficult to imagine any contract arising from a major construction project that would not
involve sufficient interstate commerce to fulfill the terms of the federal Act.").
56. Higley South, Inc. v. Park Shore Dev. Co., 494 So. 2d 227, 230 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) ("We... reject the notion that we should find... commerce... from the nature and
magnitude of the construction undertaken by [general contractor]. Common knowledge or
surmise cannot substitute for proof or, as in this case, a pleading alleging the presence of
interstate commerce.").
57. The intent test was first suggested by Chief Judge Lumbard in Metro Indus. Painting
Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). The case involved a construction contract between general contrac-
tors (Connecticut and New Jersey corporations) and subcontractors (New York corporation
and residents) concerning a housing project in Florida. Id. at 383. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the facts found by the lower court supported the finding that the
transaction involved commerce. Id. at 384. Chief Judge Lumbard, in a concurring opinion,
agreed on the result reached by the majority, but he suggested different reasons and ap-
proaches to the definition of commerce. Id. at 385 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). He argued
that since there was no indication that Congress in enacting the USAA had intended to affect
state law, the concept of commerce under the USAA should be narrowly defined. Id. at 386-
87 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). He then suggested a test to determine commerce based on the
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underlying transaction actually involved interstate commerce.5 8 Use of
one test to the exclusion of the other may lead to a finding that interstate
commerce is not involved in a given case.59 Simultaneous use of the two
tests, on the other hand, would promote a finding that interstate com-
merce is involved.6
Finally, a court must decide what degree of interstate commerce is
sufficient to invoke the application of sections 1 and 2. Some courts have
adopted a position in favor of finding involvement of interstate com-
merce.61 According to this position, a transaction between residents of
different states involves interstate commerce because it will involve inter-
state travel, payment or other contacts.62 On the other hand, some
courts have required that "substantial interstate activity" be proved
before the USAA will be applied.63
More often than not, federal law is more favorable to enforcement of
arbitration agreements or awards than state law. Therefore, the federal
parties' intention as manifested in the agreement rather than on what in fact happened. Id. at
387 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
58. Cf id. at 384-85.
59. In Action CATV, Inc. v. Wildwood Partners, Ltd., the court found that contracts to
construct a community antenna television system and to manage the system did not involve
commerce. 508 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The court used the parties' intent test
as suggested by Chief Judge Lumbard in Metro. Id. at 1276. In contrast, the court in Withers-
Busby Group v. Surety Indus., Inc found that although the parties had contemplated extensive
business in the future on a nationwide scale, the case did not involve interstate commerce
because there was no evidence that such business ever materialized. 538 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1976).
60. See C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp.
446, 450 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (involvement of commerce based on both subjective and objective
elements); Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 417-
20, 279 S.E.2d 816, 823 (198 1) (commingled two tests to determine involvement of commerce;
concluding that "[tihe contractual provisions, the parties' circumstances at the time of the
agreements, and the actual manner of performance, considered together, make clear that the
parties in making the contract contemplated substantial interstate activity.").
61. See, e.g., Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d
238, 243 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Citizens of different states engaged in performance of contractual
operations in one of those states are engaged in a contract involving commerce under the
[USAA]. Such a contract necessitates interstate travel of both personnel and payments.").
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Riverfront Properties, Ltd. v. Max Factor III, 460 So. 2d 948, 953-54 (Fla,
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (contract in question did not evidence degree of interstate activity neces-
sary to invoke USAA, although contract contemplated use of interstate banking and commu-
nication facilities); T.J. Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App.
659, 663, 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984) ("In the situation presented by the record the parties could
not have contemplated that 'substantial interstate activity' would be required in carrying out
the contract. All the 'activity' under the contract was to occur in North Carolina and the only
thing that was to happen elsewhere was that defendant was to receive the rental payments at
its office in Great Falls, Montana.").
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policy favoring arbitration would be better served by a broad definition of
involvement of commerce allowing federal law to apply instead of state
law."4 Under such a broad definition of involvement of commerce, trans-
actions like architectural service contracts, construction contracts, and
investment contracts could be deemed to involve interstate commerce,
unless contrary proof is provided, because those transactions may involve
interstate activities like interstate personal travel, payment, purchase of
goods or communication. Where proof is required to show interstate ac-
tivities, such requirement should not be unduly strict. Courts should find
involvement of interstate commerce where it can be shown that either the
parties have contemplated interstate activities or the underlying contract
evidences a transaction that actually involved commerce regardless of the
parties' intent. Furthermore, proof of substantial interstate activities
should not be required because such a requirement would only add un-
certainty as to the amount of interstate activity required.
A broad definition of commerce would provide state courts with a
useful ground for enforcing arbitration agreements and awards where
state law is not helpful. For instance, in some state cases courts could
find involvement of interstate commerce and apply federal law rather
than struggling with state law that did not support the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.6" Where the underlying contract evidences a
transaction under section 2, any strict definition of involvement of com-
merce in order to preserve application of those state rules disfavoring
arbitration should be rejected.6 6
In a few cases, state courts have found that commerce was not in-
64. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 400 (federal law favored arbitration of fraudu-
lent inducement of container contract while New York law might deny arbitration of issue);
R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127
(1982) (Kansas law did not enforce arbitration agreement with regard to "claim in tort");
Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. ofEduc., 303 N.C. at 417-18, 279 S.E.2d at 822-23 (arbitration
agreement was not enforceable under applicable state law); Caudill v. Board of Educ., 47
A.D.2d 610, 364 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975) (under New York law, whether claim was time-barred
was for court to decide).
65. See Board of Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., where, under West Virginia law, the
agreement to arbitrate future disputes in a construction contract was revocable. 221 S.E.2d
882, 884 (W. Va. 1975). The court justified enforcement of the agreement on the ground that
the agreement was a condition precedent to bringing an action. Id. at 885. Interestingly, the
court could have enforced the agreement under section 2 of the USAA by finding that the
contract evidenced a transaction involving commerce under the broad definition of commerce.
In Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., an Iowa corporation purchased steel products
from a New York seller. 258 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1977). Under Iowa law the arbitration
agreement was not enforceable. Id. at 325. The court held that the agreement was enforceable
by finding that New York law applied. Id. at 326-29. The court could have applied section 2
of the USAA by finding that interstate commerce was involved.
66. Federal law and policy control state court determinations of whether contracts evi-
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volved and the USAA did not apply.67 In those cases, application of
state law instead of federal law better served the policy favoring arbitra-
tion, because state law appeared to be more favorable than federal law to
enforcement of arbitration agreements or arbitration awards.68 Even if
the result obtained from application of state law is more favorable to
arbitration, a denial of involvement of commerce is not the best justifica-
tion for application of state law. Courts may justify application of state
law either on the ground that the underlying contract does not evidence a
transaction within the meaning of section 2 or by arguing that the federal
rule in question is not necessary for enforcement of federal arbitration
rights and that state law is consistent with the federal policy favoring
arbitration.69 To hold that commerce is not involved only' adds confu-
sion to the matter.
B. Parties' Choice of State Law
Parties to a contract often agree that the law of a particular state
governs their contract. Generally, parties' choice-of-law agreements are
recognized and enforced by courts.70 However, the question arises
whether a choice-of-law agreement could prevent application of section 2
dence transactions involving commerce. See, e.g., R.J. Palmer Constr. Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d at
365, 642 P.2d at 129.
67. Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Mich. App. 727, 733, 335 N.W.2d 139, 141, appeal
denied, vacated in part, 419 Mich. 932, 355 N.W.2d 111 (1983).
68. See Downing, where the court of appeal found an automobile insurance contract did
not evidence a transaction involving commerce, because every event relevant to the case took
place in Michigan. 124 Mich. App. at 733, 335 N.W.2d at 141. The court thus refused to
apply the three-month limit for bringing a vacatur action under section 12 of the USAA. Id.
at 733, 335 N.W.2d at 141-42. The court instead applied the 20-day limit under state arbitra-
tion law and barred the action for vacatur. Id. at 731-32, 335 N.W.2d at 141.
69. See id. at 733, 335 N.W.2d at 141 (contract did not evidence transaction involving
interstate commerce); Supak & Sons Mfg. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979)
(federal statute did not conflict with New York and North Carolina decisional law).
70. The parties' choice of applicable law, or "party autonomy," as it is often called, was
disfavored by American courts in the past. See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115
(2d Cir. 1931) (Hand, J.); J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1079-86 (1935). Today, party
autonomy is generally recognized and parties' choice-of-law agreements are enforceable in
court. See Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 592-93 (1953); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film
Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1946). See also generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1986). Party autonomy is subject, however, to limitations. A
common limitation is that the jurisdiction whose law is chosen by the parties should have a
certain relationship or contact with the transaction, parties or contract. See Farris Eng'g
Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969); A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co.,
3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957). Where the transaction involves
more than $250,000, New York no longer requires that the choice of New York law bear a
reasonable relationship to New York. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney
1989).
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where the underlying contract evidences a transaction involving
commerce.
A number of federal and state cases oppose the idea that the parties'
choice-of-law agreements could displace otherwise applicable federal law
regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements.71 In
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,72 the party resisting arbitra-
tion argued that termination of a contract pursuant to a force majeure
clause73 terminated the contract's arbitration agreement.74 This party
based its argument on Illinois law, which the parties had designated as
the law governing the validity, interpretation and performance of the
contract and each of its provisions.75 The trial court rejected this argu-
ment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.76 The court of appeals stated:
Parties are not free to burden the arbitration process under the
Federal Act by adopting state law which shifts the determina-
tion of disputes from arbitrators to courts. To allow parties to
so contract would undermine the provisions of the Federal Act.
Congress, in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, exercised its
power over admiralty and interstate commerce. Any arbitra-
tion contract involving one of those areas is governed by the
Federal Act. To permit the parties to contract away the appli-
cation of the Act by adopting state law to govern their agree-
ment would be inconsistent with the Act itself and with the
holding in Prima Paint.7 7
On the other hand, a few cases have held that the federal law should
not preempt the state law chosen by the parties to apply under an arbitra-
71. See, eg., Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1973); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972); American Airlines,
Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959). See also Missouri
ex rel. Saint Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887, 891-92 (Mo. App. 1982)
(applying USAA despite choice of Missouri law by parties); Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co.
v. Eichleay, 637 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tenn. 1982) (application of USAA in state courts is not
altered by contractual provision calling for application of Tennessee law).
72. 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1976).
73. Id. at 1266.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1268-69.
76. Id. at 1274.
77. Id. at 1269. See also Collins Radio Co., 467 F.2d at 997 (parties' choice-of-law clause
designated Texas law shall apply); Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partner-
ship, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981) (parties' choice-of-law clause designated North
Carolina law shall apply); Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App.
1973) (parties' choice-of-law clause designated New York law shall apply); Pinkis v. Network
Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973) (parties' choice-of-law clause desig-
nated New York law shall apply).
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tion agreement.78 In Mid-Atlantic Toyota v. Charles A. Bott, Inc.," an
agreement between a Pennsylvania car dealer and a Maryland car dis-
tributor provided for arbitration of any claim by the dealer.80 Section
XIVG of the agreement included the following language:
The parties acknowledge and agree that this Agreement is
[made] or is deemed to have been made in the County of How-
ard, State of Maryland, and shall be governed by and construed
according to the laws thereof. If any provision herein contra-
venes the laws of any state or other jurisdiction wherein this
Agreement is to be performed, such provision shall be deemed
to be modified to conform to such laws, and all other terms and
provisions shall remain in full force and effect.81
After disputes arose, the dealer filed a complaint with the Penn-
sylvania State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salesper-
sons, an agency empowered by Pennsylvania law to hear and determine
the dealer's complaint.82 The Board determined that it had jurisdiction
over this case despite the arbitration clause between the parties. 83 The
court rejected the argument that state law could not invalidate an arbi-
tration agreement, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Southland Corp. v. Keating.84 The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court pointed
to the choice-of-law provision in the agreement, stating: "[I]n this case,
the parties have stipulated that their Agreement is to be deemed modified
by the laws of any state in which it is to be performed. Thus, to the
extent that the arbitration clause conflicts with [Pennsylvania law], the
latter must be considered controlling."8 "
78. See, e.g., Cindy's Candle Co. v. WNS, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 973, 975-77 (N.D. 111. 1989)
(applying Texas law, as chosen by parties, to determine validity of arbitration agreements).
79. 101 Pa. Commw. 46, 515 A.2d 633 (1986).
80. Id. at 50, 515 A.2d at 635.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 48-49, 515 A.2d at 634.
83. Id. at 49, 515 A.2d at 635.
84. Id. at 50-51, 515 A.2d at 635 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
See infra notes 96-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of Southland Corp. v. Keating.
85. Mid-Atlantic Toyota, 101 Pa. Commw. at 51, 515 A.2d at 636 (footnote omitted). An-
other reason for the court in this case to refuse to apply Southland Corp. was that the Mid-
Atlantic Toyota case involved state administrative proceedings, whereas Southland Corp. only
dealt with state judicial proceedings. Id. at 52, 515 A.2d at 636. This distinction seems weak
in light of the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Despite state courts' reluctance to interfere with administrative proceedings
as a matter of public policy, state courts are bound to apply federal law and policy to uphold
an arbitration agreement governed by the USAA under the federal Constitution's Supremacy
Clause. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. Section 3 of the USAA addresses stay of judicial
proceedings. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Arguably, a stay of state administrative proceedings was not
contemplated by the drafters of the USAA. Id. In such a case, the party seeking arbitration
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The policy in favor of arbitration is mainly based on the policy in
favor of enforcement of the parties' agreement.86 The court's interpreta-
tion of the choice-of-law clause in Mid-Atlantic Toyota is problematic.
The clause provided that the contract should be modified if applicable
state laws conflicted with its provisions.87 Although this language is
stronger than a regular choice-of-state-law clause, it is still doubtful that
the parties had actually intended this state-law-controlling provision to
apply to anything other than the substantive part of their contract.8s To
suggest, on the one hand, that the parties had expressed their willingness
to arbitrate their future disputes, but on the other hand, intended the
validity and enforceability of their arbitration clause to be governed by a
particular state rule that would invalidate the arbitration clause would be
unreasonable. Arbitration agreements would be defeated too easily
under the vagaries of state law whenever the parties refer to state law.
As a matter of policy, choice-of-law provisions should not be interpreted
as intending to displace the application of federal law to arbitration
agreements. 89
However, the suggestion is not that the parties' choice-of-law clause
should have no effect whatsoever on the determination of the formation
and validity of an arbitration agreement. Section 2 of the USAA allows
application of those state contract rules and principles which do not
has three options: (1) It may initiate the arbitration proceeding despite pending administrative
proceedings, and proceed with an ex parte arbitration proceeding; (2) it may initiate an arbitra-
tion proceeding, and upon refusal of the other party to participate, may further institute an
action under 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) to compel the resisting party to arbitrate; or (3) it may
directly petition a federal or state court under 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) to compel arbitration. Use
of any of these options avoids the technical problems posed by section 3. See infra notes 158-
277 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship of sections 3 and 4 of the
USAA to state court proceedings.
86. Mid-Atlantic Toyota, 101 Pa. Commw. at 52, 515 A.2d at 636.
87. Id. at 50, 515 A.2d at 635.
88. Id. at 50-51, 515 A.2d at 635-36.
89. In Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., the contract had a choice-of-law clause providing for
application of Illinois law. 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974). The Court did not consider the possibil-
ity that enforceability of the arbitration agreement would be governed by Illinois law instead of
federal law. Id. at 510-21. In accord is Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, where
in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, Justice O'Connor interpreted the non-waiver
provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as invalidating the inconsistent substantive
contract provisions but not the arbitration agreement in an investment contract. 482 U.S. 220,
227-31 (1987). The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc v. Board of Trustees, did not deal with the effect of the parties' choice-of-law clause on the
validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements where commerce is involved. 109 S. Ct.
1248 (1989). The Court merely held that the parties' choice-of-law clause would displace the
federal law with regard to the issue of whether a court had discretion to stay arbitration where
the case involved non-arbitrating third parties. Id. at 1254-56.
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thwart the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 90
C. Application of State Law Under Section 2
Section 2 of the USAA does not describe how the issues of validity,
enforceability and formation of arbitration agreements should be de-
cided. The last sentence of section 2 provides that an arbitration agree-
ment can be revoked on such grounds as exist in law or equity." Section
2, therefore, does not exclude application of state law. Thus, the ques-
tion becomes which type of state rules may apply under section 2.
In commenting on the role of state law under section 2, Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote:
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applica-
ble if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-
law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that
a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this
requirement of § 2. A court may not, then, in assessing the
rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe
that agreement in a manner different from that in which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state
law.
92
Under this test, the state rules that single out arbitration agreements
and make them invalid, unenforceable and revocable are excluded from
section 2.9' Excluded state rules include those that allow a party to re-
voke an arbitration agreement or allow a party to maintain a lawsuit with
regard to a particular issue or claim despite the existence of an arbitra-
tion agreement.9 4 Alternatively, state rules that set particular, unfavora-
90. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See also infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. A choice-of-
law clause can also affect the application of rules and procedures in judicial proceedings. See
infra notes 228-77 and 338-49 and accompanying text.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
92. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. See, eg., id. at 484 (limiting California statute which provides that actions for collec-
tion of wages may be maintained without regard to arbitration agreement); Knoxville Hotel
Properties, Ltd. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 546 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (state statute that
allowed owner to revoke arbitration agreement held inapplicable to contracts affecting inter-
state commerce); Missouri ex. rel. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887,
890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (party could not bypass arbitration proceeding even though contract
was governed by state law). State law might not be preempted by federal regulatory rules
governing arbitration in particular areas. For instance, the United States Supreme Court re-
fused to interfere with application of a California law that invalidated arbitration of wage
claims between an employer and an employee in the securities industry pursuant to federal
regulations. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 139-40
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ble requirements for the validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements are similarly excluded from section 2.15
1. Southland Corp. v. Keating
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,96 the issue was whether disputes aris-
ing under the California Franchise Investment Law97 were arbitrable
where the USAA was applicable.98
The California statute provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive
compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder
is void." 99 The California Supreme Court interpreted this provision as
requiring judicial determination of claims arising under the Franchise
Investment Law.x°° Therefore, the court refused to enforce the parties'
agreement to arbitrate such claims.101
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
state court's interpretation directly conflicted with section 2 of the
USAA and violated the federal Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 102
One issue raised in the case was how to interpret the saving clause under
section 2.103 Under the saving clause, arbitration agreements are treated
exactly as any other contract. 1" In Southland Corp., the non-waiver
provision in the California statute did not address the validity of arbitra-
(1973). However, since the USAA could apply in such cases, state law would eventually be
preempted by the USAA. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
95. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 158
(1st Cir. 1983) (Puerto Rico rule required that arbitration agreement involving local dealer
must be arbitrated in Puerto Rico and governed by local law), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
473 U.S. 614 (1985); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 997 n.2 (8th Cir.
1972) (Texas rule required that arbitration agreements, in order to be "valid, enforceable and
irrevocable," must be signed by parties' attorneys, not simply by parties themselves); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790, 792-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (USAA prevailed over Florida rule which denied enforcement of arbitration agreement
incorporating law of another state).
96. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
97. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977).
98. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 3.
99. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).-
100. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982),
appeal dismissed in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
101. Id. at 604, 645 P.2d at 1203-04, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72.
102. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.
103. Id.
104. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (Con-
gress' intent behind saving clause of section 2 to make arbitration agreements enforceable as
any other contract).
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tion agreements. 105 The non-waiver provision could arguably be a gen-
eral ground for contract revocation under the saving clause since the
provision could also be used to invalidate contract provisions other than
arbitration agreements. 106
To the Court, though, the non-waiver provision clearly did not gov-
ern contracts in general. 10 7 Rather, the Court's holding indicates its sen-
timent that the provision only invalidated contracts subject to the
California Franchise Law if the contracts were contrary to a particular
state policy.10 To a majority of the Court, the provision was not a
ground that existed at law or in equity for revoking any contracts within
the meaning of the saving clause. 109
In light of Southland Corp., the saving clause of section 2 of the
USAA 1 10 may not apply to state rules that protect essentially local, paro-
chial interests. Such rules include those governing contracts by a party
doing business in the state without proper licensing or registration11" ' or
those restricting the capacity of certain classes of persons or entities to
contract. 112
105. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16. See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
106. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 16 n.11.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
111. See, eg., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-17-1, 60-13-12 (1978). Some states have not recognized the validity of an arbitration
proceeding when a party was an unlicensed or unregistered business according to state law.
See, e.g., Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949); Shaw v.
Kuhnel & Assoc., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985); In re Schwartz, 74 A.D.2d 638, 425
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1980); Anton Sattler, Inc. v. Cummings, 103 Misc. 2d 4, 425 N.Y.S.2d 476
(1980). The courts in these cases did not discuss whether the USAA should apply. However,
restrictive state laws should not prevent enforcement of federally created arbitration rights.
See Ommani v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 789 F.2d 298, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1986) (if state-law
certification is prerequisite to doing business in state and is interpreted as denying party its
right to enforcement of federal arbitration, then state law might be preempted); Grand Ba-
hama Petroleum Corp. v. Asiatic Petrofeum Co., 550 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1977) (New York law
precluding nonqualifying foreign corporation from suing in state court does not affect arbitra-
tion rights under federal law). See also Murray v. J & S Constr. Co., 607 F. Supp. 45, 47-48
(D. Miss. 1985) (Mississippi's door-closing statute does not bar enforcement of award from
arbitration proceeding).
112. See, e.g., OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 735.05 (Baldwin 1989). For instance, some state
or local laws impose additional requirements on a governmental entity's capacity to contract,
and arbitration agreements may not be enforced for failure to comply with these requirements.
See, e.g., City of Zanesville v. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp., 97 A.D.2d 64, 468 N.Y.S.2d 271
(1983) (enforcement of arbitration agreement made without city council's approval denied).
Some cases reject state or local restrictions on a governmental entity's capacity to contract as
obstacles to enforcement of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v.
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2. Contracts of adhesion or unconscionability
Where a case involves a state rule which clearly is a ground in law
or equity for the revocation of any contract, the issue arises as to how to
interpret and apply the state rule under section 2. One illustration of this
issue is the rules governing adhesion contracts and unconscionability.
The issues surrounding contracts of adhesion arise when a standard-
ized form of agreement, drafted by one party having superior bargaining
power, is presented to another party whose choice is either to accept or
reject the contract without the opportunity to negotiate its terms. 113 Not
all standardized contracts are unenforceable contracts of adhesion.'
14
Generally, such a contract is unenforceable against the weaker party if it
is (1) not within the reasonable expectations of that party, or (2) within
the reasonable expectations of the party, but when considered in its con-
text is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy.' 15 In
practice, the terms "contract of adhesion" and "unconscionability" refer
to the same problems.' 1 6 If a state statutory or decisional rule departs
from the above-mentioned general rules governing contracts of adhesion
and unconscionability and, as a result, arbitration agreements become
more vulnerable under the state rule than under the general rule, then
the state rule is beyond the scope of the saving clause of section 2 of the
USAA. 117
Generally, unconscionability analysis is comprised of two elements:
substance and procedure."i 8 The procedural issue is whether an arbitra-
Kimball, 860 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1988); Evans Elec. Constr. Co. v. University of Kan. Medical
Center, 230 Kan. 298, 634 P.2d 1079 (1981).
113. See, e.g., M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1489
(9th Cir. 1983).
114. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 294-95 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1064 (1986); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 778-79
(N.D. Ga. 1983).
116. See, e.g., Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., where the Supreme Court of South
Dakota used the terms "contract of adhesion" and "unconscionability" interchangeably. 358
N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984). See also generally Note, Unconscionability Refined: California Im-
poses New Duties on Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1983).
117. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.l1. For example, adhesion contracts are excluded
from Iowa's arbitration statute. Iowa Code § 679A.1(2)(a) (1983). In Mutual Serv. Casualty
Ins. Co. v. District Court, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in applying the contract-of-adhesion
exclusion provision, refused to enforce an arbitration clause in an insurance policy against the
insurance company which had drafted and prepared the policy. 372 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa
1985). This decision departed from the general contract-of-adhesion rule, which only protects
the weaker or adherent party. See Note, supra note 116, at 163-65 n.8. The result in Mutual
Serv. Casualty made an arbitration agreement more vulnerable than the general contract-of-
adhesion rule would, and therefore would be unacceptable under the saving clause of section 2.
118. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 114, § 4.28, at 314-15.
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tion agreement is an unenforceable contract of adhesion because the
weaker party has not been informed of the existence of the arbitration
agreement or has not specifically consented to the arbitration agreement
which is part of a standardized contract." 9 Federal cases suggest that,
like most other provisions in a contract, an arbitration provision is valid
and enforceable as long as the parties have consented to the contract as a
whole and there is no statutory requirement that a party be informed of
the existence of the arbitration agreement or specifically consent to the
agreement. 120 According to federal cases, an arbitration agreement is not
invalid under the general rules of adhesion contracts and unconscionabil-
ity simply because the adherent party could not negotiate the contract or
specifically consent to the arbitration agreement. 12 1 Therefore, state
rules requiring specific consent to arbitration clauses generally 122 or deal-
ing with a particular type of arbitration 123 may not apply under the sav-
ing clause.
1 24
One issue regarding substantive unconscionability is whether an
agreement to arbitrate which deprives the adherent party of its right to
court action is beyond that party's reasonable expectations or is unduly
oppressive, unconscionable and against public policy. 125 Under the
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, there is nothing unreasona-
119. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223
(1987); Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
120. See, e.g., Kline v. Henrie, 679 F. Supp. 464 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (arbitration agreement
between investor and broker valid despite investor's claim that she had not realized she signed
an arbitration agreement); Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 243
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The focus of this court is not on whether there was subjective agreement to
all clauses in the underlying contract but whether there was agreement to the contract
embodying the clause in question.").
121. In most cases, contract-of-adhesion or unconscionability claims are directed to the
contract as a whole, not to the arbitration agreement specifically. Under the doctrine of sepa-
rability, as adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp., such a claim
would be decided by the arbitrators. 388 U.S. at 406-07. See infra notes 184-95 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the separability doctrine.
122. For instance, the Missouri arbitration statute requires inclusion of the following state-
ment in ten-point capital letters adjacent to or above the signature line: "THIS CONTRACT
CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED
BY THE PARTIES." Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.460 (1980).
123. Some state statutes require that patients specifically consent to arbitration agreements
in medical service contracts. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982); see also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4235 (West 1983).
124. As discussed above, if an agreement involves relationships or matters which are pri-
marily state concerns, such as medical malpractice disputes, the USAA may not apply because
the underlying contract does not evidence a transaction involving commerce within the mean-
ing of section 2. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
125. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
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ble, oppressive or unconscionable about the use of arbitration itself.126
Thus, if a state law provides that a particular agreement to arbitrate is
unconscionable, that law does not qualify under the saving clause of sec-
tion 2.127
Another issue is whether specific provisions within an arbitration
agreement could be unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable as a con-
tract of adhesion."2 ' California courts in investor-broker arbitration
cases have held that the provisions for arbitration under the Constitution
and Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or the Code of Arbitration Procedure of National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) do not meet the level of integrity requisite to
withstand a challenge of unconscionability. 29 In those cases, the courts
held that arbitration clauses were unenforceable because any panel se-
lected by the brokers would be biased against investors.
130
In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,3 the California Supreme Court re-
fused to recognize the validity of an arbitration proceeding conducted
according to an arbitration clause in a standard contract known as the
126. Id. See, ag., Brick v. J.C. Bradford, 677 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (D.D.C. 1987) (nothing
unconscionable per se in agreement to arbitrate in securities or commodities disputes). In
Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc., the court held:
[A]n agreement to arbitrate in New York [does not pose] unconscionable difficulties.
While the parties are thus to utilize a forum and rules of decision different from those
they would have had if the matter had been litigated [in the Virgin Islands], this is
the sort of business arrangement that is fairly left to the contracting parties. Its
burdens are not excessive.
351 F. Supp. 596, 601-02 (D.V.I. 1972). But see Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807,
623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1981) (arbitration clause which required weaker party to
accept arbitration with stronger party as judge found unconscionable).
127. As Justice Marshall said in Perry, "[A] court [may not] rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be uncon-
scionable." 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
128. See generally Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988);
Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1097, 228 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1986); Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 179 Cal. App. 3d 935, 225 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1986).
129. Lewis, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 345; Prudential, 179 Cal. App. 3d at
935, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
130. E.g., Lewis, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51 (agreement to arbi-
trate under NYSE or NASD rules not enforceable); Prudential, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 944-45,
225 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (agreement to arbitrate under NYSE rules not enforceable); Richards v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 906, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 30
(1976) (court invalidated portion of agreement providing for arbitration under NYSE rules).
In these cases, however, the courts held that arbitration may proceed in a neutral arbitration
forum. Lewis, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1107, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 351; Prudential, 179 Cal. App. 3d at
946, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
131. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
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American Federation of Musicians (AFM) Form B Contract. 132 The
contract was between plaintiff, a musical concert promoter, and defend-
ant, a professional musician and member of the AFM.133 The arbitration
agreement provided for arbitration of disputes by the International Exec-
utive Board of the AFM.1 34 The court found that the provision consti-
tuted an unenforceable contract of adhesion because arbitration before
one party's union's executive board lacked "minimum levels of integ-
rity," and an agreement providing for such arbitration was unconsciona-
ble.'3 5 However, the court did not completely invalidate the arbitration
clause, ordering arbitration to take place before a neutral arbitrator.,36
In the above cases, the California courts apparently interpreted and
applied generally accepted principles regarding contracts of adhesion, to
find portions of the arbitration agreements unenforceable. Does their in-
terpretation and application of these general principles apply to analysis
of the saving clause of section 2 of the USAA?
Cases in which courts refused to enforce arbitration provisions
under the NYSE or NASD rules contradict federal case law. Federal
cases have upheld arbitration proceedings conducted under NYSE and
NASD rules.'3 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cook, Inc.,' 38 recognized that uncon-
scionability could be a ground for invalidating an arbitration
agreement. 139 However, the court opposed the application of California
courts' interpretation and application of the unconscionability rule to se-
curities arbitration cases, stating that "[t]he strong federal policy favor-
ing arbitration, coupled with the extensive regulatory oversight
performed by the SEC in this area, compel the conclusion that agree-
ments to arbitrate disputes in accordance with SEC-approved procedures
are not unconscionable as a matter of law.' 14°
It seems rather clear that although state rules regarding contracts of
adhesion can still apply under the saving clause of section 2,'4' determi-
nation of whether a particular arbitration forum is acceptable is an issue
132. Id. at 812, 623 P.2d at 167, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
133. Id., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
134. Id. at 812-13, 623 P.2d at 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
135. Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
136. Id. at 831, 623 P.2d at 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
137. See, eg., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 359-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978) (court held composition of NYSE arbitration panel to be within rule of reason and not
in violation of antitrust laws).
138. 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 286.
140. Id.
141. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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for the federal courts.14 2 If federal case law does not indicate whether
the agreement to arbitrate in a particular forum is unconscionable, state
courts should decide the issue in light of the federal interest and policy
favoring arbitration.
Although the USAA does not expressly allow a court to change the
parties' choice of arbitrators, arbitration rules, or arbitration forum, fed-
eral case law indicates that a court may determine whether the parties'
choice is enforceable. 143 Therefore, a state court should apply the state
contract-of-adhesion rule to invalidate arbitration clauses to the extent
that application of state law does not conflict with federal precedents.
However, the state court should not refuse altogether to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate.
3. Formation of arbitration agreements under the Uniform
Commercial Code
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs the
formation of contracts, including arbitration agreements between
merchants.'44
One frequently litigated issue in arbitration cases is whether inclu-
sion of an arbitration agreement is a material alteration within the mean-
142. California cases have recognized that federal interpretation of contract-of-adhesion
rules preempts state court interpretation. Heily v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 255, 258-
59, 248 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1988) (where USAA applied, court was not permitted to apply
state contract-of-adhesion or unconscionability rule to entertain challenges raising institutional
bias of arbitration panels); Tonetti v. Shirley, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1144, 1148, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616,
618 (1985) (California adhesion contract rule held inapplicable to enforcement of arbitration
agreement).
143. See, eg., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 387
F.2d 768, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1967) (obligation to arbitrate valid even though named arbitrator
was disqualified because arbitration would be ordered before qualified arbitrator).
144. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1989). It provides in part:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless ac-
ceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Id. Essentially, section 2-207 deals with two situations: first, where a written confirmation
sent after an agreement has been reached orally or by other informal means includes the terms
so far agreed upon and additional terms not discussed; second, where a written "acceptance"
following an offer includes additional or different terms. Id. comment (1). Arbitration agree-
ments are often a part of those additional or different terms. The question is how section 2-207
applies to the determination of the formation of arbitration agreements between merchants.
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ing of section 2-207(2)(b).145 For example, the Court of Appeals of New
York in Marlene Industries Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., '46 held that
"the inclusion of an arbitration agreement materially alters a contract for
the sale of goods, and thus, pursuant to section 2-207 (subd. [2], par. [b]),
it will not become a part of such a contract unless both parties explicitly
agree to it."' 4 7 The same rule has been adopted in other states.148 On
the other hand, a Michigan court adopted the position that whether an
arbitration agreement is a material alteration within section 2-207 should
be decided on a case by case basis.1
49
At the federal level, no open opposition exists to acceptance of UCC
rules governing formation of arbitration agreements under section 2.
One open question is whether the UCC should be regarded as a state law
or as federal common law. While a sizable number of federal cases deal-
ing with the issue have regarded the UCC as state law in arbitration
cases,150 it has been suggested that the UCC apply in federal arbitration
cases as federal law.' The next question is how state interpretation and
application of section 2-207 should be treated under the USAA. The
145. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Hosiery Mills, 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Mar-
lene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410
(1978); Frances Hosiery Mills v. Burlington Indus., 285 N.C. 344, 204 S.E.2d 834 (1974); Just
Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (1971).
146. 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978).
147. Id. at 333, 380 N.E.2d at 242, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 413. Prior to Marlene Industries, New
York courts were divided on the issue. See Helen Whiting, Inc. v. Trojan Textile Corp., 307
N.Y. 360, 367, 121 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1954) (use of arbitration became custom and usage in
textile industry); Gaynor-Stafford Indus. v. Mafco Textured Fibers, 52 A.D.2d 481, 485, 384
N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (1976) (arbitration clause not material alteration, but became part of con-
tract because arbitration was widely used in textile industry); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves
Bros., Inc., 35 A.D.2d 194, 197, 315 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (1970) (using section 2-201 of U.C.C.
to justify existence of arbitration agreement). Cf In re Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 A.D.2d 216,
220, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (1962) (arbitration agreement must be clear and direct and should
not depend solely on conflicting forms which cross one another but never meet).
148. See, e.g., Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972); Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 285 N.C. 344, 204
S.E.2d 834 (1974); Just Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (1971).
149. American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 171, 154
N.W.2d 5, 14 (1967).
150. See, e.g., Coastal Indus. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.
1981); Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979); C. Itoh & Co.
(Am.) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Davis Hosiery Mills,
442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Valmont Indus. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 419 F. Supp. 1238
(D. Neb. 1976).
151. See, eg., Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1405
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying U.C.C. as federal common law in holding that arbitration agree-
ment was material alteration). See also Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845
(2d Cir. 1987) (citing U.C.C. section 2-207 as generally accepted principle of contract law
dispositive of whether arbitration agreement is enforceable under USAA).
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application by federal courts of case law within a single state may lead to
different results because case law within a state may vary as to whether
an arbitration agreement is a material alteration or not. 152 Moreover,
since application of section 2-207 varies from state to state, the applica-
tion by a federal court of state interpretations of section 2-207 has pro-
duced different results.
1 53
The issues raised by section 2-207 of the UCC illustrate lack of uni-
formity that can result from application of state rules under section 2 of
the USAA. In fact, as a product of the efforts for unification of contract
law among states, the UCC may be regarded as a perfect model of state
rules applicable to arbitration agreements under the USAA. Unfortu-
nately, the UCC does not always result in uniformity of rules in arbitra-
tion cases among states or even between courts in the same state.
1 54
Lack of uniformity of interpretation of the UCC at state court levels re-
sults in uncertainty in federal court section 2 cases. State courts, in turn,
receive no clear guidance from federal law as to when they are bound by
the federal substantive law under section 2. The federal courts could
detach themselves from any particular state interpretation of the UCC.
In the face of uncertainty and lack of uniformity of state law, federal
courts should be able to develop a set of federal rules for interpretation of
the UCC in arbitration cases. 155 Another way to deal with the problem
would be for federal courts to rely upon those state interpretations of the
152. See, e.g., Graniteville Co. v. Star Knits of Cal., 680 F. Supp. 587, 589 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (following New York cases in examining usage of trade to determine whether arbitration
clause constitutes material alteration); Imptex Int'l Corp. v. Lorprint, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1572,
1572 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same). Compare Hart Ski Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Hennecke,
GmbH, 711 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting In re Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 A.D.2d
216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962), which held arbitration agreement to be material alteration) with
Thallon & Co. v. M. & N. Meat Co., 396 F. Supp. 1239, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (following
New York case law to hold arbitration agreement was material alteration). See also Coastal
Indus., 654 F.2d at 379-80 (applying New York case law to hold arbitration agreement was
material alteration); Fairchild-Noble Corp. v. Pressman-Gutman Co., 475 F. Supp. 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
153. For example, one group of federal cases holds that whether an arbitration agreement is
a material alteration is a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis. Hart Ski Mfg.
Co., 711 F.2d at 846; N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1976);
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169 n.8 (6th Cir. 1972). Other federal
courts have applied state law in holding arbitration agreements to be material alterations. See,
e.g., Supak & Sons, 593 F.2d at 137 (applying New York and North Carolina law). Finally,
some federal courts apply state law and hold that an arbitration agreement is not a material
alteration. Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709, 714-15 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying Illinois law).
154. See generally Annotation, What Are Additional Terms Materially Altering Contract
Within Meaning of UCC § 2-207 (2)(b)?, 72 A.L.R. 3d 479, 482-505 (1976 & Supp. 1989).
155. See, e.g., Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d at 846 (federal law governs whether agreement
to arbitrate has been made and federal policy favors arbitration).
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UCC which support the federal policy favoring arbitration. 5 6 Alterna-
tively, federal courts could develop independent federal rules without re-
ferring to or following the UCC.15
7
IV. SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE USAA
Section 3 of the USAA deals with enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in a pending lawsuit.158 Section 4 of the USAA deals with peti-
tions for enforcement of an arbitration agreement where one party
refuses to arbitrate.1 59
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 6 the United States
Supreme Court held that section 3 is part of the regulatory scheme to
enforce the kind of agreement which sections 1 and 2 brought under fed-
eral regulation. 61 The Court held, however, that the USAA did not cre-
ate federal question jurisdiction for the federal courts, and that a case
brought in federal court for enforcement of a section 2 arbitration agree-
ment had to otherwise satisfy the requirement of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.162 Thus, in some cases, enforcement of arbitration agree-
156. See, e.g., Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co., 831 F.2d at 715.
157. See, e.g., Genesco, Inc, 815 F.2d at 845.
158. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Section 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default with such arbitration.
Id.
159. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Section 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the contro-
versy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the parties, and
upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....
Id.
160. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
161. Id. at 201. Prior to Bernhardt, lower federal courts held that a court could apply
section 3 even though the arbitration agreement in question did not fall under section 2. See,
e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364, 374-75 (D. Neb. 1948).
Also prior to Bernhardt, courts held that section 4 was available only while the arbitration
agreement was governed by section 2. See, e.g., id. at 375.
162. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198 (applying Erie doctrine, indicating no federal question ju-
risdiction). Section 3 provides for a stay by a "court in which such suit is pending," and
section 4 provides that enforcement may be ordered by "any United States district court
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ments covered by sections 1 and 2 would be left to state courts. 163 The
issues to be discussed are whether and how a state court should apply
provisions under sections 3 and 4, if the arbitration agreement falls
within section 2.
A. Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
Sections 3 and 4 of the USAA provide only one method for enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements covered by section 2-specific enforce-
ment.' 64 Could a state court, in enforcing an arbitration agreement
governed by section 2 of the USAA, choose a method of enforcement
other than specific enforcement?
The language used in sections 3 and 4 and the legislative history of
the USAA seem to suggest that the sections are aimed primarily at fed-
eral court proceedings. 6 Section 4 refers to the "United States district
court;"' 166 this language indicates that Congress intended to limit the ap-
plication of the section to federal courts.67
Section 3 is somewhat less clear; it refers to the "courts of the
United States."' 168 Arguably, "courts of the United States" under section
3 means federal district courts, because state courts are courts "in" but
not "of" the United States, as commonly designated in federal law.169
Sections 3 and 4 constitute part of the same regulatory scheme under the
USAA; thus, "courts of the United States" under section 3 and "United
States district court[s]" under section 4 should be interpreted simi-
larly.'70 The legislative history of the USAA also suggests that sections 3
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction." 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). See, e.g.,
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
163. A state court might have to decide whether to enforce an arbitration agreement gov-
erned by section 2 of the USAA if there is no independent federal subject matter jurisdiction, if
the case has been brought in the state court and no request for removal has been made, or if
the parties have agreed that the state court has exclusive jurisdiction to compel arbitration. Cf.
Monte v. Southern Del. County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1963) (Steel, J., concurring).
164. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
165. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25-30 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Congress did not intend the [USAA] to govern state-court proceedings ... .
166. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
167. In 1954, "United States district court" was inserted by Congress in § 4 to replace
"court of the United States." Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 19,'68 Stat. 1226, 1233. This
amendment reflected the premise that such a proceeding would be brought only in a federal
court and specifically in a district court. H.R. REP. No. 1981, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8; S. REP.
No. 2498, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3991,
3998.
168. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
169. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 29-30 n.18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 29 n.17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and 4 were intended to regulate federal procedures for enforcement of
arbitration agreements covered by section 2.171
If the specific enforcement provisions under sections 3 and 4 did not
apply to state courts, the state courts would be free to choose and de-
velop their own methods for enforcement, such as an award of compen-
satory or punitive damages for violation of the arbitration agreement, or
award of litigation costs to a party who is willing to arbitrate. 72 Such
results clearly thwart the basic advantages of arbitration 17 3 and therefore
would run counter to the federal policy favoring arbitration. The very
essence of the policy encouraging use of arbitration is to remove cases
from courtrooms. x74 Therefore, specific enforcement is the only method
that promotes the policy favoring arbitration in cases involving breach of
an arbitration agreement.'75
Recent Supreme Court cases conclude that specific enforcement is
the only method of enforcement available to state courts where an arbi-
tration agreement is covered by section 2.176 The Court indicated that
specific enforcement is part of the federal substantive law under section 2
of the USAA. 177 It held that when section 2 speaks of enforceability and
irrevocability of arbitration agreements, it creates an obligation on a
court, whether federal or state, to specifically enforce such agreements.1
7 8
171. The House Report on the USAA stated: "The matter is properly the subject of federal
action. Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of proce-
dure . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). After the enactment of the
USAA, the American Bar Association, which had participated in drafting the legislation,
stated that "[t]he statute establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements .... A federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements does relate solely to procedure of the federal courts." Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar Association, The United States Arbitration Law
and its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 154 (1925) [hereinafter Committee on Commerce, The
United States Arbitration Law].
172. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 31-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits of arbitration.
174. See Committee on Commerce, The United States Arbitration Law, supra note 171, at
155-56.
175. Congress seemed unimpressed by the common-law practice of awarding damages for
breach of arbitration agreements and therefore did not allow for damage awards in the federal
arbitration statute. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
176. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10, 14-15.
177. Id. at 10-12.
178. Id. at 16 & n.10. When confronted with the issue of applicability of sections 3 and 4 to
state court proceedings where the arbitration agreements fell within section 2, state courts have
almost unanimously held that those sections are applicable. See Main v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-81 (1977)
(section 4); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (section 3); GAF Corp. v. Werner, 66 N.Y.2d 97, 104, 485 N.E.2d 977,
982, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1985) (sections 3 and 4), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986);
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Thus, sections 3 and 4 should be applied to arbitration agreements gov-
erned by the USAA under sections 1 and 2.
Like federal courts, state courts are faced with crowded court dock-
ets, and have the same incentive to encourage use of arbitration by specif-
ically enforcing arbitration agreements. 7 9 Moreover, application of
sections 3 and 4 by state courts where commerce is involved would have
the wholesome effect of promoting uniformity of arbitration rules and
discouraging forum shopping.18
0
B. Division of Functions Between Courts and Arbitrators
Court functions are limited under both sections 3 and 4.18 Under
section 3, upon a party's petition, a court should stay a lawsuit pending
an arbitration proceeding if the court decides that: (1) there is an arbitra-
tion agreement; (2) the issue involved in the lawsuit or proceeding is ref-
erable to arbitration under the agreement; and (3) the applicant for the
stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."8 2 Under sec-
tion 4, a court should grant a petition to compel arbitration upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not at issue.18 3 All other issues should be left for the
arbitrators to decide. The question arises whether a state court should be
bound by such a division of functions between the court and arbitrators
where the arbitration agreement is governed by the USAA.
1. The doctrine of separability
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., s4 the issue was
whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of an entire contract was to
AAACon Auto Transp., Inc. v. Newman, 77 Misc. 2d 1069, 1071, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173-74
(1974) (section 4); C.P. Assocs. v. Pickett, 697 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (sec-
tion 3); Galtney v. Underwood Neuhaus & Co., 700 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(section 3); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604, 608-
09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (sections 3 and 4), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1024 (1985).
179. For a demonstration of state judges' support for the use of arbitration, see Lavorato,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: One Judge's Experience, 42 ARB. J., June 1987, at 64; McDon-
ald & Bivins, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts, 42 ARB. J., June 1987, at 58;
Spatt, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, 42 ARB. J., June 1987, at 61.
180. The North Carolina Supreme Court has said: "Parties in a state court to a contract
evidencing [sic] an interstate transaction should not be permitted to avoid arbitration when,
had the action been brought in federal court, they would have been compelled to arbitrate."
Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 422 n.16, 279
S.E.2d 816, 824-25 n.16 (1981).
181. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
182. Pioneer Supply Co. v. American Meter Co., 484 F. Supp. 227, 229 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
183. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
184. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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be decided by the court or referred to the arbitrators."8 5 After examining
the language of sections 3 and 4, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the statutory language did not permit the court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract and the claims should
be arbitrated.186 The Court adopted what Justice Black in dissent de-
fined as the doctrine of separability. 8 7 Under this doctrine, when the
validity of a contract is challenged generally, but the arbitration clause is
not challenged specifically, the claim should be decided through
arbitration. 188
The doctrine of separability primarily addresses how courts are to
conduct themselves with respect to enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments once the validity and enforceability of the agreements is beyond
dispute. 89 Arguments have been made that the doctrine may not apply
to state court proceedings.1 90 If the doctrine does not apply, as when the
arbitration agreement is governed by the USAA, and a state court is al-
lowed to decide a claim attacking the contract generally, enforcement of
the arbitration right under federal law could be delayed or even de-
nied.'91 Moreover, if a court determined that the contract was fraudu-
lently induced and therefore invalid, the arbitration agreement would
also become invalid.
192
Therefore, the decision whether to apply the doctrine of separability
involves the substantive issue of the validity and enforceability of the ar-
bitration agreement with regard to attacks upon container contracts., 9
3
By adopting the doctrine of separability, the Supreme Court in Prima
Paint Corp. made it clear that as a matter of federal law a court has no
power to pass on the validity and enforceability of container contracts. 194
Therefore, several state courts have held that the doctrine of separability
applies to state court proceedings where an arbitration agreement is gov-
185. Id. at 402.
186. Id. at 404.
187. Id. at 399-400; id. at 409 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. The Supreme Court rejected application of New York law to the issue of whether the
fraudulent inducement claim was to be decided by a court or arbitrators. Id. at 404-05.
189. Id. at 405.
190. See Atwood, supra note 8, at 92.
191. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir.
1959) (action to recover for fraudulent misrepresentation inducing purchase agreement), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
192. See, eg., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel &
Assocs., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985).
193. "Container contract" as used herein refers to an underlying contract which contains
an arbitration clause.
194. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403-04.
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erned by the USAA. 19 5
2. Statutes of limitations
Neither section 3 nor section 4 expressly allows a court to decide
whether claims subject to arbitration are barred by statutes of limita-
tions.196 Federal case law suggests that arbitrators decide this issue.
19 7
However, the arbitration statutes in some states expressly authorize the,
court to decide the issue of whether a claim is time-barred under the
applicable statute of limitations.
198
Whether a claim is time-barred affects the enforceability of the arbi-
tration agreement. 199 Federal courts, by letting the arbitrators decide the
issue of statute of limitations, do not recognize statutes of limitations as
grounds for revocation of an arbitration agreement."° Therefore, where
interstate commerce is involved, the state court should let arbitrators de-
cide the effect of statutes of limitations, even though the state arbitration
law provides for judicial determination of the issue. 1
C. Interpretation of the Scope of Arbitration Agreements
Under both sections 3 and 4, a court should decide whether the
scope of the parties' arbitration agreement is broad enough to cover par-
ticular issues. 20 2 Some authorities support the view that the issue of in-
195. See, e.g., Konewko v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 939, 528 N.E.2d 1
(1988), cert. denied, 539 N.E.2d 915 (1989); Sentry Sys., Inc. v. Guy, 98 Nev. 507, 654 P.2d
1008 (1982); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Ref, Ltd., 37 A.D.2d 531, 322
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1971); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973).
196. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
197. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Harrison & Crosfield, 204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1953). On the other hand, the issue of
whether the contractual right to arbitration is barred by a statute of limitations is normally
decided by courts. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 204 F.2d at 369.
198. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5702(c) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-5 (Supp.
1989); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7502(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
199. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 580, 255
N.E.2d. 774, 776-77, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).
200. Id. at 581, 255 N.E.2d at 777, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
201. Some state courts have held that federal law preempted state law in authorizing courts
to decide whether the claim subject to arbitration was barred by the statute of limitations. See
A/SJ. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 25 N.Y.2d at 579, 255 N.E.2d at 776-77, 307 N.Y.S.2d at
663-64; Caudill v. Board of Educ., 47 A.D.2d 610, 364 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975). See also ADC
Constr. Co. v. McDaniel Grading, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 223, 338 S.E.2d 733 (1985).
202. Section 3 provides for stay o" court proceedings if the court is satisfied that the issue
involved "is referable to arbitration under such an agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Similarly,
section 4 requires a court to inquire as to the making of an arbitration agreement, which
includes the issue of the scope of the agreement. See id. § 4. See also I.S. Joseph Co. v.
Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1986).
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terpretation, like the issues of validity and enforceability, should be
governed by federal law where the arbitration agreement falls under sec-
tion 2 of the USAA.z03
In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.," the Second
Circuit held that the USAA created federal substantive rules not only for
validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements falling
within the Act, but also for interpretation and construction of those
agreements.20 5
We hold that the body of law.., is substantive not procedural
in character and that it encompasses questions of interpretation
and construction as well as questions of validity, revocability
and enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate
commerce or maritime affairs, since these two types of legal
questions are inextricably intertwined. 0 6
Robert Lawrence Co. clearly exhibited "a liberal policy of promoting
arbitration.""2 7 As part of the scheme of enforcement of federal arbitra-
tion rights, federal rules for interpretation of arbitration agreements
should apply to state court proceedings.208
203. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir.




207. Id. at 410. See also Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d
382, 385 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey has said:
What emerges [after Robert Lawrence Co.] is this principle, that in interpreting the
scope of an arbitration clause, that is, in endeavoring to determine what the parties
intended would be arbitrable, federal courts are not to apply the traditional rules of
contract construction, but rather a federal rule that seemingly requires a clearly ex-
pressed intent not to arbitrate an issue before such issue can be ruled one for judicial
determination; and, further, that if the issue is a doubtful one, the doubt is to be
resolved in favor of arbitration.
Singer Co. v. Tappan Co., 403 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 513 (3d Cir.
1976). See also Falcone Bros. Partnership v. Bear Stearns & Co., 699 F. Supp. 32, 34
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (federal law governing interpretation of arbitration agreement displaced well-
established contra proferentum principle).
The Robert Lawrence court's use of section 2 of the USAA to justify its decision is prob-
lematic. Interpretation of the scope of an arbitration agreement is addressed in sections 3 and
4, but not section 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4 (1988). Moreover, application of section 2 cannot be
displaced by a party's choice-of-law clause. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
However, rules and procedures under sections 3 and 4 (except for specific enforcement) may be
displaced by the state law chosen by the parties. See infra notes 228-77 and accompanying
text. The parties should be able to choose a particular state law to apply to interpretation of
the scope of an arbitration agreement. See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
208. In Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., the United States Supreme
Court held that the USAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
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D. "Procedural" Rules in General
Chief Justice Burger, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,2 °9 wrote that
section 4 of the USAA, which states that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure apply in federal court proceedings to compel arbitration,2 10 does
not apply in such state court proceedings.2 1  This opinion appears to be
based on the assumption that no compelling federal interest requires the
state courts to apply federal procedural rules in enforcing an arbitration
agreement governed by federal law. An examination of the so-called pro-
cedural rules in sections 3 and 4 suggests that some of them facilitate
enforcement of the arbitration rights created by section 2212 and that
their application significantly affects implementation of federal interests
under the USAA.21 3
Some procedural provisions under sections 3 and 4 may not be ap-
plicable to state court proceedings. Section 4 of the USAA provides that
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or like
defense to arbitrability." 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Several state courts have employed federal
rules of interpretation of arbitration agreements. See Konewko v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 173
Ill. App. 3d 939, 944, 528 N.E.2d 1, 4-5, cert. denied, 535 N.E.2d 915 (1989); ADC Constr.
Co. v. McDaniel Grading, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 223, 226-28, 338 S.E.2d 733, 737-38 (1985). See
also Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 495 N.E.2d 345, 348, 504
N.Y.S.2d 82, 85, cert denied, 479 U.S. 931 (1986) (state courts are bound by federal arbitra-
tion statute regarding interpretation of arbitrability, without uniformity in federal court
decisions).
209. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
210. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
211. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.10.
212. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 29, at 271-72.
213. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 29, at 271-72. In A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Dow Chem. Co., the Court of Appeals of New York noted that while the underlying arbitration
agreement was governed by the substantive federal law, the state court could not apply its own
rules of procedure if those rules would significantly affect the result of the case. 25 N.Y.2d
576, 581, 255 N.E.2d 774, 776-77, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).
Unlike Southland Corp., where the United States Supreme Court emphasized the distinction
between substantive and procedural laws, the Court of Appeals of New York distinguished
between rules which are outcome determinative and rules which are not. Southland Corp., 465
U.S. at 16; A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 25 N.Y.2d at 582, 255 N.E.2d at 777, 307
N.Y.S.2d at 664. See also McClellan v. Barrath Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) ("The procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are not binding on
state courts, provided applicable state procedures do not defeat the rights created by Con-
gress."). The United States Supreme Court recently held that even though Congress has not
completely displaced state regulations in the area of arbitration, "state law may nonetheless be
preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that it
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.'" Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1254
(1989). The application of federal arbitration law should not depend on the characterization of
rules as "substantive" or "procedural," but rather should emphasize federal rules in the imple-
mentation of congressional purposes and objectives.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:473
arbitration hearings and proceedings shall be ordered within the district
in which the petition is filed.114 Under this provision, a court cannot
order arbitration outside its district even though the arbitration agree-
ment provides for arbitration elsewhere.215 This provision seeks to save
resources through geographic concentration of all proceedings-both ar-
bitral and judicial.2"6 Although saving resources is a legitimate interest,
the provision does not address the concern for enforcement of parties'
arbitration agreements. While federal courts feel bound by this limita-
tion, several state courts have not felt similarly compelled.21 7
On the other hand, those provisions that could affect enforcement of
arbitration rights should apply to state court proceedings. In Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,"1 8 the United States Supreme Court held that
where arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues coexisted in a case, a federal
court should take a bifurcated approach.2 19 The Court held that a lower
court should stay legal proceedings with regard to arbitrable issues, or
order arbitration of those issues while allowing non-arbitrable issues to
be litigated.220 Whether a court following Dean Witter adopts the bifur-
cated approach or not will affect the parties' substantive right to arbitra-
tion under section 2 of the USAA. Without bifurcation of proceedings,
enforcement of the parties' right to arbitration might be delayed or even
214. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
215. See, e.g., National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987);
Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Couler Int'l Ltd.
v. Saint-Tropez West, 547 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
216. See Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, 499 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1974).
Federal courts have not treated the section 4 limitation as absolute. In Dupuy-Busching Gen.
Agency v. Ambassador Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit considered the Mississippi federal district
court's compelling arbitration in New Jersey according to the parties' agreement despite the
section 4 limitation. 524 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit held that section 4
could be asserted as a counterclaim, thereby affirming the trial court's ruling. Id. at 1277.
217. See, e.g., Exparte Redshaw, Inc., 524 So. 2d 367 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (ordered arbi-
tration in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania according to agreement governed by USAA); Donmoor,
Inc. v. Sturtevant, 449 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Florida court ordered arbitration
in New York under agreement governed by USAA).
218. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
219. Id. at 217.
220. Id. at 221. Prior to Dean Witter, lower federal courts espoused one approach called
the "intertwining doctrine" in securities arbitration cases if the case involved both arbitrable
and non-arbitrable issues. Id. at 216. Under this doctrine, the court decided both arbitrable
and non-arbitrable issues. See, e.g., Belk v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d
1023 (11th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). The
Supreme Court in Dean Witter rejected this doctrine. 470 U.S. at 216-17. Although Dean
Witter dealt with non-arbitrability due to public policy or to legal restraints external to the
contracts, its holding is also applicable to cases where non-arbitrability is based on contract.
See Energy Group., Inc. v. Liddington, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1520, 238 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1987).
January 1990] FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW IN STATE COURT 511
lost."' 1 Therefore, the bifurcation approach should apply to state court
proceedings where the arbitration agreement is governed by section 2 of
the USAA. 2
Applicability of some other provisions in sections 3 and 4 may de-
pend on the degree of involvement of federal policy and interests in each
case. For example, the USAA contains venue provisions.2 2 3 These pro-
visions are primarily aimed at federal court proceedings and were not
intended to apply to state court proceedings.2 2 4 However, if a state law
denies the court jurisdiction or venue to enforce an arbitration agreement
that is otherwise enforceable under the USAA, the state law should be
preempted. For example, Florida law does not give state courts jurisdic-
tion to enforce arbitration agreements if the agreements call for arbitra-
tion according to foreign law or to the law of another state.22 5 If such an
agreement is governed by the USAA, the Florida court should have juris-
diction or venue to enforce it despite the contrary state law. 2 6 The same
should also be true with regard to other procedural matters.2 2 7
221. Under the intertwining doctrine, the Court denied arbitration altogether even though
the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and there were arbitrable issues. Dean
Witter, 470 U.S. at 216. Even under the bifurcation approach, a court may stay arbitration
until the litigation of non-arbitrable issues has been completed. See Lippus v. Dahlgren Mfg.
Co., 644 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Such an approach is questionable under Dean
Witter.
222. See, eg., Liddington, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1520, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 202. The court found
that the arbitration agreement was governed by federal law, and it held that federal law pre-
empted California law authorizing courts to stay arbitration pending resolution of related liti-
gation. Id. at 1528, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982)).
See also GAF Corp. v. Werner, 66 N.Y.2d 97, 485 N.E.2d 977, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1985),
where the court held that an arbitrator's consideration of issues involved in lawsuits was not a
basis for stay of arbitration. Id. at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 979, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
223. Section 4 provides that the federal district court should order arbitration within the
district in which the petition for arbitration has been filed. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
224. See AAACon Auto Transp. v. Newman, 77 Misc. 2d 1069, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1974).
225. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1987). See Williams v. Hardy, 468 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (court had no jurisdiction to enforce provision for arbitration in New York under
New York law).
226. Donmoor, Inc. v. Sturtevant, 449 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (court had
jurisdiction to enforce agreement for arbitration in New York despite contrary state law be-
cause USAA applied to agreement).
227. For instance, under section 4, if the making of the arbitration agreement is in issue, the
court "shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). The United States
Supreme Court said that section 4 "call[s] for an expeditious and summary hearing, with only
restricted inquiry into factual issues." Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Although federal rules regarding how a trial should be conducted may
not apply to state court proceedings, state courts should be bound by the federal requirement
of expeditious and summary hearing and restricted inquiry into factual issues.
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E. Choice-of-Law Clauses and Rules Governing Pre-Award
Judicial Proceedings
As discussed above, a choice-of-law clause cannot displace applica-
tion of federal substantive law to determine the validity, enforceability
and irrevocability of an arbitration agreement in a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce.228 Additionally, federal substantive law
implies that specific enforcement is the only method for enforcement
under the federal law.229 Therefore, a choice-of-law clause cannot be
used to displace the specific enforcement rules of sections 3 and 4 of the
USAA.2 3 0
The issue arises as to the effect of a choice-of-law clause on matters
in pre-award proceedings other than specific enforcement. The United
States Supreme Court recently passed on the issue in the context of a
conflict between federal law and California law regarding a court's dis-
cretion to stay arbitration where the case involved third parties and non-
arbitrable issues.23' The Court held that under federal law where arbi-
trable and non-arbitrable issues arise in the same case, a court has no
discretion to stay arbitration pending the outcome of a lawsuit.232 In
contrast, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2233 gives
courts discretion to stay arbitration proceedings pending resolution of
related court actions involving non-arbitrating parties.234
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,2 35 Stanford
University and Volt were parties to a contract under which Volt was to
228. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
229. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). See also supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
230. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
231. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1251-52
(1989).
232. Id. at 1254-55.
233. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
234. Id. Section 1281.2 provides in pertinent part:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbi-
trate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the contro-
versy exists, unless it determines that:
(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court
action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact.
(4) In such cases the court may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the
court action or special proceeding.
Id.
235. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
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build a system of electrical conduits for the University.236 The contract
provided for mandatory arbitration of all disputes arising from the con-
tract or its breach.237 It also provided: "The Contract shall be governed
by the law of the place where the Project is located. '2 38 After Volt
sought arbitration of its compensation claims, Stanford University filed a
lawsuit against Volt and two other companies involved in design and
management of the project.239 The contracts between the University and
these two other firms did not contain arbitration agreements.2" The trial
court denied Volt's petition to stay the lawsuit and to compel arbitration
and, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c),
granted the University's motion to stay arbitration.
241
The California Court of Appeal affirmed in a two-to-one decision.242
The court recognized that the case was governed by the USAA.2 43 How-
ever, because the contract contained a choice-of-law clause, the court
held that the parties were free to choose a state law to govern the issue of
whether arbitration should be compelled where third parties were in-
volved.2" The court said:
[I]f the parties here had expressly stated in their agreement
that they wished to arbitrate only those disputes between them-
selves which did not involve third parties not bound by the ar-
bitration agreement, this provision would presumably be
enforceable. In our view they accomplished the same thing by
choosing to be governed by California law, thus incorporating
the California rules of civil procedure governing arbitration
agreements.
245
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.246 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion, held that the California
court's construction of the choice-of-law clause as incorporating Califor-
nia arbitration rules into the parties' arbitration agreement was not re-





241. Id. at 1251 n.2.
242. Board of Trustees v. Volt Information Sciences, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 3d 349, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 558 (1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989). The court of appeal opinion was depublished
by order of the California Supreme Court; hereinafter, all citations to the California Court of
Appeal opinion are to the California Reporter.
243. Id. at 559.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 561.
246. Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1256.
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viewable because it was a question of state law.2 47 The Court rejected the
argument that the state court's decision interfered with Volt's federal ar-
bitration right.24s The Court explained that since section 4 of the USAA
expressly provided that arbitration be conducted according to the parties'
agreement, including their choice-of-law clause, Volt could enforce its
arbitration right only under California arbitration law.249 The Court also
found that the federal policy favoring arbitration did not require arbitra-
tion under a specific set of procedural rules.25 0 Finally, the Court held
that the California rule giving the state court discretion to stay arbitra-
tion was not preempted by the USAA because its application in this case
was based on the parties' agreement and was therefore consistent with
the federal arbitration policy of enforcing the parties' agreement.251
In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that the California court's con-
struction of the choice-of-law clause should be reviewable because (1) the
state court's decision denied enforcement of a federal right, and (2) the
construction of the choice-of-law clause involved federal law.252 Fur-
thermore, Justice Brennan rejected the state court's construction of the
choice-of-law clause.253 First, he stated that the purpose of a choice-of-
law clause was normally to address the relationship between the laws of
different states rather than to address any interaction between state and
federal law.254 He reasoned that no basis existed for believing that the
parties had intended their choice-of-law clause to displace application of
federal arbitration law. 55
Second, Justice Brennan observed, the parties' choice-of-law clause
referred to "the law of the place."'256 Such a reference, he said, should
not be interpreted as excluding application of federal law.25 7 Finally,
Justice Brennan expressed grave concern that if a state court could freely
interpret any choice-of-law clause as an expression of the parties' intent
to exclude the application of federal law, the federal arbitration statute
would become a nullity.
258
Justice Brennan noted that the parties could agree that a particular
247. Id. at 1253-54.
248. Id. at 1253.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1254.
251. Id. at 1255.
252. Id. at 1257-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 1260 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1261 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1261-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 1262 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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state arbitration law would govern pre-award proceedings, and that such
an agreement would be enforceable even though the case was otherwise
governed by the USAA" 9 In addition, Justice Brennan considered
whether the parties' choice-of-law clause in this case warranted applica-
tion of the California law giving a court discretion to stay arbitration
where non-arbitrating third parties are involved. 60 As noted above,261
the majority did not address this issue, because it held that the state
court's construction of the clause as incorporating the California arbitra-
tion rules into the parties' arbitration agreement was not reviewable. 62
Had the parties in Volt intended the California arbitration rules to
apply? As Justice Brennan observed, nothing indicated that the parties
in this case generally or specifically intended that the California rule giv-
ing a court discretion to stay, arbitration would apply.263 Generally, as
Justice Brennan pointed out, a choice-of-law clause addresses the issue of
application of the law of one state instead of another; it should have no
effect on the federal-state relationship because federal law is considered
"intertwined" with state law.2 This case involved a standardized con-
tract and choice-of-law clause.265 The clause did not even mention Cali-
259. Id. at 1259 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that
federal policy called for enforcing an arbitration agreement according to the parties' terms. Id.
at 1257 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also opined that the California rule giving the court
discretion to stay arbitration could be given effect if "the parties somehow agreed that federal
law was to play no role in governing their contract." Id. at 1256 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 1259 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
262. Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1252 n.4. Both the United States Supreme Court and the California
Court of Appeal conceded that the USAA would have applied absent the choice-of-law clause.
Id. at 1254; Board of Trustees, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 559. Under the USAA, arbitration could go
forward because the trial court would not be authorized to stay arbitration. Volt, 109 S. Ct. at
1254; Board of Trustees, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 560. The Supreme Court did not clearly decide the
applicability of sections 3 and 4 to state court proceedings, but assumed that they might apply.
Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1254. Justice Brennan believed that the federal policy favoring arbitration
would be frustrated by interpreting the parties' choice-of-law clause so as to displace the
USAA. Id. at 1259 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority's view on this point was unclear.
On the one hand, the majority agreed that federal law did not permit undue delay or denial in
enforcement of the arbitration agreement by granting a stay of arbitration. Id. at 1254 n.5. On
the other hand, the majority believed that the California rule would generally foster the policy
underlying the USAA. Id.
263. Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1260 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the state court decision, the dissent pointed out that
"under California law, federal law governs matters recognizable in California courts upon
which the United States has definitely spoken.... [T]he mere choice of California law is not a
selection of California law over federal law." Board of Trustees, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64
(Capaccioli, J., dissenting).
265. Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1254. In Volt, the contract in question was a standard form contract
provided by the American Institute of Architects and endorsed by the Associated General
Contractors of America. Id. The parties probably did not consider the ramifications of apply-
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fornia.266 Under these circumstances, it is highly doubtful that the clause
truly expressed the parties' intent to have California arbitration law
apply.
Where the parties had arguably not agreed that the California rule
giving the court discretion to stay arbitration applied, the relevant rule in
the USAA should not have been displaced. The application of the
USAA would provide certain and uniform results in like cases. Most
significantly, as Justice Brennan pointed out, a loose interpretation of the
choice-of-law clause in favor of application of state arbitration law would
endanger the effectiveness of the federal arbitration statute.267
State courts have the responsibility to fashion proper rules of inter-
pretation which avoid undermining federal arbitration law because the
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause in arbitration cases is a ques-
tion of state law and may not be subject to Supreme Court review.2 68 If a
choice-of-law clause does not clearly indicate that the arbitration law of a
particular state should apply to enforcement proceedings, the federal rule
should govern the issue of court discretion to stay arbitration.269
The same rationale should also apply to other matters in pre-award
proceedings such as interpretation of the scope of arbitration agreements,
and division of functions between the court and arbitrators. Parties are
ing California law to pre-award judicial proceedings when adopting the form contract with its
choice-of-law clause.
266. Id. at 1261 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The clause generally stated "the law of the place
... ." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1262 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1252-54.
269. A few months prior to its decision in Volt, the California Court of Appeals reached a
different result in a similar case. In Energy Group, Inc. v. Liddington, the Liddingtons con-
tracted for installation of energy-saving systems. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1520, 1522, 238 Cal. Rptr.
202, 203 (1987). The contract contained an arbitration clause, id. at 1523 n.3, 238 Cal. Rptr.
at 203 n.3, and also provided that the contract would be governed by California law. Id. at
1524, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 204. Later, a bank which had financed the Liddingtons' project filed a
complaint against the Liddingtons on the promissory note which evidenced the debt. Id. at
1523, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The defendants, in turn, cross-complained against various third
parties including the contractor's assignee, id., and the assignee filed a petition to compel arbi-
tration under section 3 of the USAA. Id., 238 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The Liddingtons resisted
arbitration. Id. at 1524, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The trial court stayed arbitration pending
litigation on the ground that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) gave the
court discretion to impose a stay. Id. The California Court of Appeal reversed. Id. at 1529,
238 Cal. Rptr. at 207. Applying the holdings of the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984), Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), and Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483 (1987), the California appellate court held that section 1281.2 was preempted by the
USAA, because the California rule applied only to arbitration agreements and, therefore,
should not be allowed under the USAA. Liddington, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1525-28, 238 Cal.
Rptr. at 205-07.
January 1990] FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW IN STATE COURT 517
always free to determine what matters and contracts should be subject to
arbitration; they may directly indicate in their arbitration agreement,
270
or they may agree that the issue of arbitrability be decided according to
the law of a particular state.2 7 The federal policy is that once the parties
have agreed to arbitrate, they must live up to their agreement.272 How-
ever, no federal law or policy forces parties to arbitrate certain issues
once an arbitration agreement is enforced. To honor a choice-of-law
clause on the issue of arbitrability effectively enhances faith in arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, since interpretation of arbitrability affects en-
forcement of federal arbitration rights, 273 the parties' intent to displace
otherwise applicable federal interpretation rules must be clear.
Although the issue of division of functions between courts and arbi-
trators could affect the substantive issue of enforceability of arbitration
agreements, parties can still agree on the matter of division of functions
between the court and the arbitrators.274 They can also agree that the
matter be decided according to the law of a particular state. If parties
have clearly and specifically indicated that the law of a particular state
should govern issues in pre-award proceedings, including division of
functions, the parties' clear intent and the choice-of-law clause should be
given effect.
275
For example, if the parties clearly agreed that New York arbitration
270. The USAA "does not prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain
claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement." Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1255.
271. For a case applying parties' choice-of-law clause to interpret the scope of arbitration
agreements which were covered by section 2 of the USAA, see Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron
Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Georgia law), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952
(1976).
272. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9.
273. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
274. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). See also supra notes 181-95 and accompanying text. Even the
Prima Paint Corp. Court and the Second Circuit in In re Kinoshita & Co. recognized that fraud
in the inducement of a container contract is not for arbitrators to decide if the parties did not
intend the issue to be arbitrated. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 402 (1967); In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961). The issue of parties'
intent may be a matter of contention during litigation. Full discussion of the issue is beyond
the scope of this Article. It suffices to note that the trend is towards liberal interpretation of
the parties' intent in favor of arbitrability. See, e.g., S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v.
Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 1984) (unless parties have expressly excluded
possibility of arbitration under particular circumstances, fraud-in-inducement claim is
arbitrable).
275. Volt suggests that the parties are free to choose state arbitration rules and procedures
applicable to pre-award state court proceedings even if the USAA would otherwise govern.
109 S. Ct. at 1255-56. In Prima Paint Corp., the Supreme Court implied that the issue of
division of functions between courts and arbitrators is an issue addressed by sections 3 and 4,
but not section 2. 388 U.S. at 405. Therefore, like the issue of whether a state court should
compel arbitration where a third, non-arbitrating party is involved, the division of functions
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law would govern issues in pre-award proceedings, including division of
functions, and under the New York arbitration statute the court is em-
powered to decide whether a claim subject to arbitration is barred by a
statute of limitations, the statute of limitations issue should be decided by
the court even though the underlying contract evidences a transaction
involving commerce. 276 If the parties' choice-of-law clause is merely a
general designation of which state's law is to apply, without specifying
the application of state law to issues in pre-award judicial proceedings
including division of functions, the clause should not be interpreted as
intending to have state law apply to the issue of division of functions
between the court and arbitrators. In sum, lacking a clearly expressed
specific intent, the parties should be deemed to understand that federal
law will govern the issue.27 7
V. OTHER ISSUES IN PRE-AWARD PROCEEDINGS
A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Consolidation
The USAA does not state whether a court has the power to order
preliminary injunctive relief or whether it has the power to order non-
consensual consolidation of arbitration proceedings.2 78
Federal district courts and courts of appeals are divided on the two
* 279 Saecutissues. State courts appear cautious in deciding whether to issue pre-
between courts and arbitrators should be subject to the parties' express, unambiguous choice-
of-law clause.
276. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
277. The contract in Prima Paint Corp. apparently did not have a choice-of-law clause
although the lower federal courts assumed that but for the USAA, New York law might apply.
388 U.S. at 400 n.3. As Justice Black said in dissent, it was not clear that New York law
would apply in the absence of the federal act. Id. at 411 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting). However,
some courts have consequently denied application of state law where the choice-of-law clauses
are unclear. See, e.g., Sentry Sys., Inc. v. Guy, 98 Nev. 507, 654 P.2d 1008 (1982) (applying
federal separability approach despite contract providing that California law would govern).
278. The issue of judicial consolidation of arbitration proceedings arises where, in the ab-
sence of an agreement to consolidate, a party petitions the court to consolidate different arbi-
tration proceedings in which that party is involved. See generally Stipanowich, Arbitration
and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473 (1987).
279. For an illustration of differences in federal cases as to the judicial power to issue pre-
liminary injunctive relief pending arbitration, compare Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydrau-
lics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983) (court could issue preliminary injunction), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1070 (1984) with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d
1286 (8th Cir. 1984) (court had power to issue preliminary injunction). However, a court
generally has the power to issue preliminary injunctive relief where such a remedy was ex-
pressly agreed to by the parties. See, e.g., RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 858 F.2d 227
(5th Cir. 1988). For an illustration of differences in federal cases as to the judicial power to
order consolidation, compare Compania Espanola de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527
F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975) (court had power to consolidate), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976)
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liminary injunctions where the arbitration agreements are governed by
the USAA.2 8 ° In two Texas cases, for instance, the same court held that
in determining whether it had the power to issue preliminary injunctive
relief, it had to look at federal law.28 1 In both cases, the court interpreted
federal arbitration law and policy as prohibiting a court from issuing a
preliminary injunction.282
Contrary to what the Texas court held, reasons exist for supporting
such a power. One important reason is that the issuance of preliminary
injunctive relief can preserve the status quo and effect enforcement of the
arbitrators' decisions.283 Not surprisingly, some federal cases indeed
support judicial power to issue preliminary injunctive relief.284 A state
court should be able to have the same power under its own law, even
though the arbitration agreement in question falls under section 2.285
The same is also true of the judicial power to order non-consensual
consolidation of arbitration proceedings-although such an order may
interfere with the way arbitration would be conducted under the parties'
agreements, consolidation may in some cases be necessary to prevent
harsh results from separate arbitration proceedings.2 8 6 For that reason,
with Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 568 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(court had no power to order non-consensual consolidation), aff'd, 743 F.2d 635 (9th. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984). It has been generally accepted that a court has power to
order consolidation if the parties have agreed to it. See, e.g., Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus
Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987).
280. Galtney v. Underwood Neuhaus & Co., 700 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985).
281. Galtney, 700 S.W.2d at 604; McCollum, 666 S.W.2d at 608.
282. Galtney, 700 S.W.2d at 604; McCollum, 666 S.W.2d at 609.
283. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 47-51 (Ist Cir. 1986); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052-54 (4th Cir. 1985); Roso-Lino
Bev. Distrib. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984); Sauer-Getriebe KG
v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070
(1984). See also PMS Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 854 F.2d 355, 356-58 (9th Cir.
1988).
284. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc., 797 F.2d at 47-51; Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052-54; Roso-Lino
Bev., 749 F.2d at 125; Sauer-Getriebe KG, 715 F.2d at 351. See also PMS Distrib., 854 F.2d at
356-58.
285. When state courts have issued preliminary injunctive relief, they have stated that such
relief is consistent with the policy in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. District Court, 672 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Colo. 1983). Some state statutes
authorize courts to issue preliminary injunctions pending arbitration. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-4(e) (Supp. 1989); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 7503(c) (McKinney 1980).
286. One explanation for judicial willingness to order non-consensual consolidation is that
courts wish to avoid conflicting arbitral decisions and inconsistent results. See, e.g., Compania
Espanola de Petroleos, 527 F.2d at 970. A court has only limited power to vacate or change
awards after separate arbitrations. See Consolidated Pac. Eng'g, Inc. v. Greater Anchorage
Area Borough, 563 P.2d 252, 256 (Alaska 1977) (Erwin, J., dissenting).
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some federal courts support the judicial power to order non-consensual
consolidation.287 State courts should similarly be allowed to apply state
rules to decide this issue, even where the agreement is governed by the
USAA. 288
Assessment of the benefits of judicial power to order preliminary
injunctive relief or consolidation in light of the policy of enforcement of
federal arbitration rights is essential. In general, the federal policy in
favor of arbitration and enforcement of parties' agreements should not be
equated with a hands-off approach to the arbitration right. To make ar-
bitration a fair, just and effective method of dispute resolution, some judi-
cial actions, such as orders granting injunctions, or consolidation, may
still be necessary.289 Where no clear federal rule exists on the matters,
state rules that allow courts to take such actions should not be viewed as
conflicting with the federal policy for enforcement of arbitration rights
unless the state rules would unreasonably interfere with the parties' arbi-
tration agreement.290
287. See, e.g., New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5-6 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (applying Massachusetts law), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1526 (1989); Compania Espa-
nola, 527 F.2d at 975.
288. One state court has refused to follow federal rules as to consolidation. See Vigo S.S.
Corp. v. Marship Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 157, 161-62, 257 N.E.2d 624, 626-27, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165,
169 (consolidation procedural in nature and its resolution not outcome determinative), cert.
denied sub nom. Frederick Snare Corp. v. Vigo S.S. Corp., 400 U.S. 819 (1970). Some state
laws allow the court to order non-consensual consolidation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.3 (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 251, § 2(A) (West 1988). See also Jeffer-
son County v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, 282 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 1979); Litton Bionetics,
Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981); Grover-Dimond Assocs. v. Ameri-
can Arbitration Assoc., 297 Minn. 324, 211 N.W.2d 787 (1973); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr.
Co., 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517 (1976); County of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc.j 42
N.Y.2d 123, 128, 366 N.E.2d 72, 75, 397 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (1977); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 273 S.C. 181, 255 S.E.2d 451 (1979).
289. See New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 6-7 (rejecting argument in favor of hands-off
approach; holding that judicial consolidation is like judicial power to choose arbitrators and
enforce arbitration subpoenas under sections 5 and 7 of USAA). In Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court declined to review a Texas
Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction
pending arbitration. 666 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985).
The district court opinion suggests that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not man-
date a particular result in such cases. Id. at 608-09.
290. Courts have not given adequate attention to the issue of what circumstances warrant
injunctive or consolidation orders or whether an order is proper and reasonable in a given case.
Discussions of those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. However, in determining
whether preliminary injunctive relief or consolidation should be ordered, courts should not
frustrate the parties' bargain or interfere with the domain reserved for arbitrators. See, e.g.,
Klein Sleep Prods., Inc. v. Hillside Bedding Co., 563 F. Supp 904, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (judi-
cial determination of preliminary injunctive relief should not invade province of arbitrator and
undermine arbitration process); Litton Bionetics, Inc., 292 Md. at 53, 437 A.2d at 218 (no
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B. Appellate Review Rules
Prior to the November 1988 adoption of section 15 of the USAA
concerning appeals,29' federal statutes and case law failed to satisfacto-
rily address appellate review of district court orders in pre-award pro-
ceedings.2 92 Under the new section 15, the following pre-award district-
court orders may be appealed:
(1) [A]n order-
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this
title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to or-
der arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title
to compel arbitration... ;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying
an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title;
or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is sub-
ject to this title.293
This section forbids appeals of some interlocutory orders, providing
that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an
appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order-
consolidation should be ordered if it "deprives any objecting party of a contractual right under
the arbitration agreement").
291. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702 tit. x, § 1019(a), 102 Stat. 4670 (1988)
(codified at 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)).
292. For many years the appealability of an order granting or denying a section 3 motion
was controlled by the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, under which a section 3 order-an interlocu-
tory one-was appealable if the action stayed was legal, rather than equitable, in nature. See,
e.g., Hartford Software Fin. Sys. v. Florida Software Servs., 712 F.2d 724, 726-27 (1st Cir.
1983). The Supreme Court overruled the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.. 485 U.S. 270 (1988). After Gulf stream, whether a section 3 order
was appealable depended on the "collateral order" rule and courts tended to dismiss appeals
from section 3 orders under that rule. See, e.g., McDonnell-Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Penn-
sylvania Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1988) (dismissed appeal from order
denying stay); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1988)
(dismissed appeal from order granting stay). Although a section 4 order was generally consid-
ered a final judgment and therefore appealable, cases were divided as to whether a section 4
order made concurrently with a section 3 order was appealable. Compare Langley v. Colonial
Leasing Co., 707 F.20l I (Ist Cir. 1983) (concurrent section 4 order treated as section 3 order)
with Administrative Mgt. Servs., Ltd. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (order only appealable if order would decide all issues).
293. 9 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
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(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this
title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of
this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title;
or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this
title.
294
Should these appeal rules apply to state court proceedings where the
arbitration agreements are governed by the USAA?29 5
In the past, state courts appeared to be reluctant to apply federal
appeal rules and practices, in part because state courts were not pleased
with the condition of the federal appeal rules in arbitration cases, and in
part because the appeal rules were procedural and therefore not binding
on state courts.29 6 State courts may resist application of the federal ap-
peal provisions on the ground that the rules are merely procedural.297
However, state courts may look to the federal appeal rules for guidance.
First, the new appeal rules in the USAA clearly reflect the policy
favoring the use of arbitration.2 98 The rules generally permit appeals
from orders that prefer litigation to arbitration.299 The rules also deny
appealability of orders that favor the use of arbitration.3" State courts
would likely be impressed by these policy-oriented rules because of the
strong federal interest in appellate review of pre-award orders. The clar-
ity and certainty of the new rules governing appealability should make
state courts more confident about ascertaining, and more willing to ap-
ply, the federal rules in this area.
Although uncertainty remains as to the applicability of sections 3
294. Id. § 15(b).
295. The arbitration statutes in many states contain rules for appeals from pre-award or-
ders, and these rules could differ significantly from the federal rules. For instance, section 19
of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides for appealability of certain pre-award orders, but
unlike the new section 15(b) of the USAA, it does not expressly disallow any appeals from
interlocutory orders. Compare UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 19, 7 U.L.A. 216-17 (1985) with 9
U.S.C. § 15(b) (1988).
296. See Xaphes v. Mowry, 478 A.2d 299, 301 (Me. 1984) (refusing to apply federal appeal
rule because of anomaly of Enelow-Ettelson doctrine and procedural nature of rule); McClel-
lan v. Barrath Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. App. 1987) (procedural provisions of
USAA are not binding on states provided state procedures do not defeat substantive rights
granted under USAA).
297. See, e.g., McClellan, 725 S.W.2d at 658.
298. 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
299. Id. § 15(a)(1)A-C.
300. Id. § 15(b)1-4.
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and 4 to state court proceedings, 30 1 state cases almost unanimously have
held that where the arbitration agreements are governed by the USAA,
sections 3 and 4 apply to state courts.30 2 The new appeal rules address
actions taken pursuant to sections 3 and 4, thus, it can be argued that the
appeal provisions are simply an extension of these provisions and should
likewise apply to state courts. Despite the procedural characterization of
appeal rules, the rules undeniably affect enforcement of arbitration
rights. Even though state courts may not be bound to apply the federal
appeal rules, they should as a matter of policy develop their appeal prac-
tice in line with the federal rules in order to effectively protect the federal
arbitration right and avoid forum shopping.
VI. SECTIONS 9, 10, 11 AND 12
Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the USAA 313 address post-award judi-
cial proceedings. Section 9 provides that the court shall confirm an
award upon petition within a year after the award is made unless the
award is vacated, modified or corrected. 3° Section 10 specifies a number
of grounds on which an award can be vacated. 0 5 Section 11 provides
301. The uncertainty results from the inconsistencies in United States Supreme Court cases.
See supra note 11.
302. See, e.g., Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-
25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-81 (1977); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Me-
lamed, 405 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); GAF Corp. v. Werner, 66 N.Y.2d 97,
104, 485 N.E.2d 977, 982, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986);
AAACon Auto Transp., Inc. v. Newman, 77 Misc. 2d 1069, 1071, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173-74
(1974); Galtney v. Underwood Neuhaus & Co., 700 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985);
C.P. Assocs. v. Pickett, 697 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604, 608-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1127 (1985).
303. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12 (1988).
304. Id. § 9. Section 9 provides in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court,
then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration
may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or cor-
rected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the
agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States
court in and for the district within which such award was made ....
Id.
305. Id. § 10. Section 10 provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
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grounds for modification and correction of awards.3 °6 Section 12 pro-
vides that a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award must be made
within three months after the award is made.30 7
These post-award rules and procedures mainly apply to federal
court proceedings. 30 8 The question is whether and how they should ap-
ply to state court proceedings. None of these sections expressly provide
that their applicability depends on the involvement of an arbitration
agreement governed by section 2. If the application of these sections
does not depend on the existence of a maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce, they are not part of the
scheme for enforcement of the federal substantive law under section 2,
and no reason would exist to apply these sections to state court
proceedings.
There are, however, clear indications that the post-award rules and
procedures under sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 were designed to apply to
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re-
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
306. Id. § 11. Section I 1 reads:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in
the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submit-
ted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy. The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.
Id.
307. Id. § 12. Section 12 provides in pertinent part: "[n]otice of a motion to vacate, mod-
ify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three
months after the award is filed or delivered .... " Id.
308. Sections 9, 10 and 11, like sections 3 and 4, do not create federal question jurisdiction.
Dorn v. Dorn's Transp., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub noma. Dorn's
Transp., Inc. v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 787 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, a
federal district court must otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction in any post-award pro-
ceedings under the USAA. See, e.g., id. at 824-25. See also generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569, at 171 (1984) (discussing lan-
guage of section 9); Atwood, supra note 8, at 94-95 (discussing legislative history).
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cases where the underlying transaction is maritime or the contract evi-
dences a transaction involving commerce within the meaning of section
2.
A. Section 9
The stay provision under section 3 is logically linked to the confir-
mation proceedings under section 9. When an action involves an arbitra-
tion agreement, the court should stay pending arbitration under section
3; such a stay empowers the same court to have jurisdiction to confirm
the forthcoming award under section 9.309 Section 9 proceedings thus
can be viewed as a continuation of the scheme of enforcement under sec-
tion 3.310 Moreover, if USAA post-award rules and proceedings do not
apply of their own force but are applied only because the parties are in
federal court solely on the basis of diversity, substantive provisions, such
as those addressing the grounds for vacation, modification or correction
of awards, become inapplicable under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.311 It
follows that USAA post-award rules and procedures, like USAA pre-
award rules and procedures, are applicable to a maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce only
where federal question jurisdiction exists312 pursuant to Congress' com-
merce power.31 3 Finally, like the pre-award rules and procedures, post-
award rules and procedures affect both the enforcement of section 2 and
the policy favoring arbitration.3 4 The section 2 arbitration right and the
federal policy in favor of arbitration should apply in post-award proceed-
309. See, e.g., T & R Enter. Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 613 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir.
1980) (court power to enter judgment on arbitration award was outgrowth of original action).
310. The existence of an arbitration agreement governed by section 2 has been suggested to
be one of the requirements for court jurisdiction to confirm awards under section 9. See
Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (declin-
ing jurisdiction because of lack of valid arbitration agreement).
311. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In that case, the Court held that where a federal court's jurisdic-
tion was solely based on diversity of citizenship, the court is bound by state substantive law.
Id. at 72-73.
312. See, eg., Monte v. Southern Del. County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1963) (in
post-award proceedings, court must first decide whether contract evidenced transaction involv-
ing commerce in order for USAA to apply); Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276,
278-79 (5th Cir. 1947) (USAA post-award rules and proceedings were not applicable because
contract evidencing transaction did not involve maritime or commerce).
313. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
314. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) ("Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."). An
award cannot be confirmed if the underlying arbitration agreement is not valid or enforceable.
See, e.g., Duplan Corp., 442 F. Supp. at 89.
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ings through sections 9, 10, 11 and 12.3'5 Presumably, sections 9, 10, 11
and 12 of the USAA enforcement scheme intend to promote the federal
policy in favor of arbitration where the underlying contract evidences a
transaction involving interstate commerce. Accordingly, these sections
should also apply to state court proceedings.316
Under section 9, an award is presumed to be valid unless it is va-
cated.3 17 The burden to vacate the award is on the party opposing its
confirmation.318 Confirmation rules and procedures clearly reflect the
federal policy in favor of confirmation of arbitration awards and should
be binding on a state court post-award proceeding where the underlying
contract evidences a transaction involving commerce. 3 9 Section 9 has
also been interpreted as preempting state law that contains a confirma-
tion venue-limitation provision. °
Not all provisions under section 9 are applicable to state court pro-
ceedings. For instance, the "entry of judgment agreement rule' 31 ad-
dressing the issue of federal court jurisdiction does not appear to fall
within the substantive portion of the USAA, nor support the federal pol-
315. See Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l Inc., 776 F.2d 269, 270 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (in light of federal policy favoring arbitration, court should resolve all doubt in
favor of arbitrator's award); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 1984)
(interpreting section 12 to enhance role of arbitration as mechanism for speedy dispute resolu-
tion); Diapulse Corp. v. Cabra, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting section
11 in line with purposes of arbitration as relatively quick and inexpensive resolution of con-
tract dispute); Office of Supply v. New York Nay. Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972)
(interpreting section 10 to further objectives of arbitration); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, F &
P. R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1310-16 (D.D.C. 1981) (interpreting and applying section 10 to
enforce section 2 arbitration right).
316. Some state courts recognize that USAA post-award rules and procedures apply to
state court proceedings. See Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 251
Ga. 701, 703, 308 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1983); Tampa Motel Mgmt. Co. v. Stratton of Florida, Inc.,
186 Ga. App. 135, 138-39, 366 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1988); Trident Tech. College v. Lucas &
Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 103-04, 333 S.E.2d 781, 785 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060
(1986). But see Atlantic Painting & Contracting, Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d
841, 846 (Ky. 1984).
317. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
318. Id. See also Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1275
(2d Cir. 1971).
319. See Trident Tech. College, 286 S.C. at 111, 333 S.E.2d at 789.
320. See Tampa Motel, 186 Ga. App. at 139, 366 S.E.2d at 807 (court applied federal stat-
ute rather than Georgia venue statute to confirmation proceedings).
321. Under this rule, a court can confirm an award "[i]f the parties in their agreement have
agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
arbitration .... 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988) (commonly referred to as "entry of judgment agreement
rule"). Conversely, if the parties do not enter into such an agreement, a federal district court
would decline to confirm the award. See Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208, 210
(2d Cir. 1973).
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icy in favor of arbitration.3"' Therefore, that portion of section 9 might
not apply to state court proceedings.
B. Sections 10 and 11
The rules and procedures contained in sections 10 and 11 provide
for disturbance of arbitration awards,323 in apparent contradiction to the
policy favoring arbitration.3 24 As a result, some courts seem uncertain
whether such rules and procedures should apply to state courts. 325 This
uncertainty is unfounded. The rules and procedures under sections 10
and 11 should apply to state court proceedings where the underlying con-
tract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce-the stan-
dard should be no different. The policy in favor of arbitration does not
mean that post-award judicial proceedings simply "rubber stamp" the
arbitrator's decision. A court should have unrestricted authority to re-
view the arbitrator's decision 326 because federal policy does not favor
confirmation of an award per se.3 27 However, federal policy and interests
do require that state courts be bound by the list of grounds in sections 10
and 11 on which awards can be disturbed.32  Although the grounds
under sections 10 and 11 of the USAA do not differ significantly from the
grounds in many state arbitration laws,3 29 federal courts have generally
322. The entry of judgment agreement rule has been criticized by federal courts. Compania
Chilena de Navegacion Interoceanica, S.A. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., 652 F. Supp. 1512, 1515
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]he continued applicability of Varley as a limitation on federal jurisdic-
tion to confirm arbitration awards is highly questionable."); Harris v. Brooklyn Dressing
Corp., 560 F. Supp. 940, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rule is "a dead letter").
323. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1988).
324. See Trident Tech. College, 286 S.C. at 103, 333 S.E.2d at 785 (stating that in order to
advance underlying policy in favor of arbitration, scope of judicial review is necessarily
limited).
325. See, e.g., Hilton Constr. Co., 251 Ga. at 703, 308 S.E.2d at 831-32. In Hilton Constr.
Co., the lower court held that state courts had no jurisdiction to vacate under section 10 be-
cause the section addresses only "the United States court." The Supreme Court of Georgia did
not decide this issue on appeal. Id. at 702, 308 S.E.2d at 831.
326. In commenting on the public policy in favor of arbitration in the New York's first
modem arbitration statute, Judge Cardozo said:
The declaration of such a policy does not call for a relaxation of restraints upon the
conduct of the arbitrators in so far as those restraints have relation to the fundamen-
tals of a trial and the primary conditions of notice and a hearing. Indeed, they are
more important now than ever if arbitration is to attain the full measure of its pos-
sibilities as an instrument of justice.
Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N.Y. 315, 316, 146 N.E. 436, 437 (1925).
327. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150
(1968).
328. See Trident Tech. College, 286 S.C. at 111, 333 S.E.2d at 789.
329. The grounds for vacation, modification or correction under the Uniform Arbitration
Act, for instance, are similar to sections 10 and 11 of the USAA. As one commentator has
said, "[tihe grounds for judicial vacatur of an arbitration award are surprisingly uniform
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
interpeted these grounds to favor enforcement of arbitration awards
more so than state courts have.330 For instance, under federal law the
claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract is arbitrable.331 In Minne-
sota, however, the same claim is arbitrable only if the claimant seeks
damages instead of rescission, and if the language of the arbitration
agreement is particularly broad in scope.332 Under this standard, a Min-
nesota court could set aside an arbitration award that failed to meet these
requirements.333
Availability of punitive damages is another area where federal and
state court interpretation of arbitration laws differs. The courts in some
states prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, 334 whereas
federal courts have not created such a prohibition.335 Based upon the
supremacy of federal law,33 6 where federal and state laws conflict, federal
rules and practices more favorable to the enforcement of arbitration
awards should preempt state rules and practices.337
C. Section 12
Under section 12, a motion for vacation, modification or correction
must be served within three months after the award is filed or deliv-
ered.338 Application of this time limit to state court proceedings has been
opposed on the ground that section 12 is procedural in nature.339 A care-
ful examination of cases suggests that whether the three-month time limi-
tation applies to state court proceedings depends on how this provision is
interpreted in light of federal policy and interests.
One issue under section 12 is whether a party is allowed to raise a
defense, based on sections 10 or 11, to a motion for confirmation after the
three-month period has expired. For many years, federal courts held
throughout the United States-more uniform, in fact, than any other aspect of arbitration
law." G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 62 (1983).
330. Id. at 67-68. Cf. Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983).
331. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967).
332. See Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 629 (award vacated because lower court had erred in
letting arbitrator decide claim of fraudulent inducement).
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831 (1976).
335. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (1lth Cir. 1988).
336. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
337. Costa & Head (Atrium), Ltd. v. Duncan, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (Ala. 1986)
(award of punitive damages confirmed applying federal law). Cf. RPJ Energy Fund Mgmt. v.
Collins, 552 F. Supp 946 (D. Minn. 1982) (federal law applied to validity of award in fraudu-
lent inducement claim; state law held irrelevant).
338. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
339. Atlantic Painting & Contracting, 670 S.W.2d at 846-47.
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that the three-month time limitation under section 12 did not bar such a
defense. 3" This position differed from that adopted by some state juris-
dictions.341 The federal position gave a dissatisfied party more time to
challenge the award, and thereby delayed the finality of awards. State
courts were unwilling to adopt the federal position in state proceed-
ings.342 However, the present federal position subjects a defense to a mo-
tion to confirm the three-month time limitation of section 12. 34 This
position favors the finality of awards and reflects federal policy in favor
of enforcement of awards.
344
In summary, which limitation rule-federal or state-applies to
state court proceedings should depend on which rule facilitates enforce-
ment of arbitration awards. A state court may prefer the state limitation
rule if that rule is more favorable to enforcement of awards.345
If the parties have chosen a particular state forum for enforcement
of the award but have not specified that the state post-award rules and
procedures will apply, the state court should still be bound by the federal
post-award rules if the underlying contract evidences a transaction in-
volving interstate commerce and the USAA is applicable.3 46 A party's
340. See, e.g., Riko Enter. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Moran v. Paine Webber, 279 F. Supp. 573, 581 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 242
(3d Cir. 1968).
341. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61, 65-66 (Colo. 1988); Mid-
American Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Modern Builders Indus. Concrete Corp., 101 Il. App.
3d 83, 86, 427 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Education Ass'n, 286 Md. 358,
364-66, 408 A.2d 89, 92-93 (1979).
342. See Kress Corp. v. Edward C. Levy Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 264, 269, 430 N.E.2d 593,
595 (1981) (applying Illinois law).
343. See Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1986); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz,
750 F.2d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 1984).
344. Taylor, 788 F.2d at 225; Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 175-77 (outcome determinative time
limitation provision is susceptible to application by state courts.). See also Tampa Motel, 186
Ga. App. at 140, 366 S.E.2d at 808 (court relied on present federal interpretation of three-
month time limitation under section 9).
345. See, e.g., Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Mich. App. 727, 732, 335 N.W.2d 139, 141
(applying 20-day time limitation on motion to vacate under Michigan law, instead of three-
month limitation under federal law), appeal denied, vacated in part, 419 Mich. 932, 355
N.W.2d 111 (1983).
346. In John Ashe Assocs., Inc. v. Envirogenics Co., the arbitration clause provided:
Any dispute arising under this order which is not disposed of by agreement between
the parties shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with part 3 of Title 9 of the
Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California. A judgment based on the award
shall be entered in the Superior Court of the State of California in the county having
jurisdiction thereof.
425 F. Supp. 238, 242 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The district court ruled that the agreement to the
entry of judgment by a state court was enforceable. Id. at 243-44. However, the court was of
the opinion that the relief under sections 10 and 11 for vacation and modification would still be
available. Id. The court relied in part on its earlier decision in Litton RCS, Inc. v. Turnpike
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reason for entering into a choice-of-forum agreement may be unrelated to
that forum's law governing post-award proceedings. For example, the
parties may have chosen a state forum because of convenience or because
state proceedings may be speedier than federal proceedings. The parties
may not have a particular preference for state post-award rules and pro-
cedures over federal post-award rules and procedures. In such cases, fed-
eral post-award rules should not be displaced by the parties' choice-of-
state forum provision.
If, however, the parties have expressly agreed that the court in a
particular state has exclusive jurisdiction for enforcement of awards and
that the post-award rules and procedures in that state govern the judicial
proceedings, the state court should apply state rules and procedures even
if the underlying contract evidences a transaction involving interstate
commerce. Although a choice-of-law clause cannot operate as displacing
the federal law governing validity and enforceability of an arbitration
agreement, 47 the law as chosen by the parties might still be applied to
determine many issues in pre-award proceedings, as well as in post-
award proceedings.34a
Federal law and policy allow parties to agree on solutions to issues
in post-award proceedings. For instance, under federal case law, the par-
ties' agreement that the court can apply a review standard stricter than
standards provided under the USAA is enforceable.349 If parties have
freedom through their agreement to decide matters in post-award pro-
ceedings, they should also be allowed, to an extent, to let those matters
be governed by the law they choose. However, because of the impor-
tance of the USAA post-award rules and procedures in enforcement of
federal arbitration rights, the parties' agreement as to the law applicable
to post-award proceedings should be clear and unambiguous in order to
displace the otherwise applicable federal post-award rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether and how federal arbitration law applies to state court pro-
ceedings should depend on consideration of two factors: (1) involvement
of the federal policy favoring arbitration and enforcement of arbitration
Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579, 585 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975) (Penn-
sylvania Common Pleas Courts were proper forum for confirmation proceedings, but they
were bound by federal substantive law). John Ashe Assocs., 425 F. Supp. at 241.
347. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987).
348. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1253-54 (1989).
349. Fils et Cable d'Acier de lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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rights created by federal law; and (2) the parties' intent as expressed in
their choice-of-law agreement.
The enactment of the USAA demonstrates that Congress favors en-
forcement of arbitration and the development of federal arbitration law
reflects a strong federal policy promoting the use of arbitration.350 The
policy favors enforcement of arbitration agreements and the resulting
awards.35 Generally, the USAA creates a federal arbitration right
where the transaction is maritime or the contract evidences a transaction
involving interstate commerce.352 Once an arbitration agreement is
found to fall within the USAA, the enforcement of arbitration rights is
deemed to involve federal interests, regardless of whether the case is in
federal or state court.353
Arbitration rights are based on an underlying contract. Honoring
parties' agreements is one of the most important goals of the federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration.354 Accordingly, if parties prefer application of
the law of a particular state, their agreement should be honored. How-
ever, parties' choice-of-law agreements should be interpreted in accord-
ance with federal policy and law.355 An interpretation of a choice-of-law
agreement which frustrates enforcement of an otherwise valid, enforcea-
ble and irrevocable arbitration right is unreasonable and inconsistent
with federal policy.356
Federal rules of arbitration can be broken down into three catego-
ries, in terms of their applicability to state court proceedings. First, sec-
tion 2 of the USAA creates federal substantive law governing the
validity, enforceability and irrevocability of arbitration agreements where
the transaction is maritime or the underlying contract evidences a trans-
action involving interstate commerce. 7 This section applies to state
court proceedings. 358  The parties' choice-of-law provision cannot dis-
place the application of federal substantive law or prevent its specific
enforcement.359
350. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
352. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
353. See Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1254.
354. See id. at 1253-54.
355. See Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579, 590 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975).
356. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir.)
(Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
357. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
358. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
359. Id. at 11 ("We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceabil-
ity is subject to any additional limitations under State law.").
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Although section 2 does not preclude a role for state law in deter-
mining the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements, 360 only
generally recognized state contract rules apply.361 Even so, those state
rules cannot prevail if they directly conflict with federal law.362 The defi-
nition of interstate commerce should be read broadly in order to bring as
many contracts as possible within the ambit of the USAA. Bringing the
maximum number of contracts within the USAA would further the wor-
thy federal policies favoring arbitration and discouraging forum shop-
ping. Therefore, courts must uniformly interpret and apply the contract
rules in arbitration cases governed by section 2.
The second category is comprised of USAA rules which are part of
the enforcement scheme of the federal substantive law governing arbitra-
tion rights and the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 363 The rules address the scope of arbitration agreements, 364
the division of functions between courts and arbitrators, 36 bifurcated
proceedings, 366 and matters in post-award proceedings, 367 such as stan-
dards of review and time limitations. Although some of these rules may
be characterized as procedural, they should apply to state court actions
because they determine the outcome of federally created arbitration
rights.
However, important exceptions to the universal supremacy of fed-
eral law exist. Federal rules do not automatically preempt conflicting
state rules. Preemption depends on whether any important federal poli-
cies or interests are served through its application. If state rules and pro-
cedures are equally or more effective than federal rules in promoting the
enforcement of arbitration agreements or the resultant award, the state
provisions might stand. Also, if the parties clearly and unambiguously
intended that the arbitration rules of a particular state apply, those state
rules should apply. Additionally, state courts may not be required to
apply a federal procedural rule. However, if the rule could affect the
outcome of arbitration rights, a state court should apply the federal
rule.
368
360. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
361. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.l1.
362. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text for discus-
sions of the rules regarding contracts of adhesion and unconscionability.
363. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4, 9-12 (1988). See also supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
364. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1988). See also supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
365. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1988). See also supra notes 181-201 and accompanying text.
366. See also supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
367. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12 (1988). See also supra notes 303-49 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 291-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of appeal rules; see
supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 12's time limitation.
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Finally, in some areas, whether the federal rules apply or not is im-
material to promotion of the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements or the resultant awards. Sometimes state rules are
more favorable to enforcement of the federal arbitration rights than the
relevant federal rules.3 6 9 No reason exists for a state court to be bound
by the federal rules in such a case. Also, state courts should not be re-
quired to apply federal rules where the federal rules are not clear, and
application of state rules, if reasonable, would not frustrate federal
policy.
370
369. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 12's time
limitation; see supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of venue provisions.
370. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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